


International Energy Agency
Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme



Task 13 Performance, Operation and Reliability of Photovoltaic Systems



Quantification of Technical Risks in PV Power Systems 2021



What is IEA PVPS TCP?

The International Energy Agency (IEA), founded in 1974, is an autonomous body within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Technology Collaboration Programme (TCP) was created with a belief that the future of energy security and sustainability starts with global collaboration. The programme is made up of 6.000 experts across government, academia, and industry dedicated to advancing common research and the application of specific energy technologies.

The IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme (IEA PVPS) is one of the TCP's within the IEA and was established in 1993. The mission of the programme is to "enhance the international collaborative efforts which facilitate the role of photovoltaic solar energy as a cornerstone in the transition to sustainable energy systems." In order to achieve this, the Programme's participants have undertaken a variety of joint research projects in PV power systems applications. The overall programme is headed by an Executive Committee, comprised of one delegate from each country or organisation member, which designates distinct 'Tasks,' that may be research projects or activity areas.

The IEA PVPS participating countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and the United States of America. The European Commission, Solar Power Europe, the Smart Electric Power Alliance (SEPA), the Solar Energy Industries Association and the Cop- per Alliance are also members.

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What is IEA PVPS Task 13?

Within the framework of IEA PVPS, Task 13 aims to provide support to market actors working to improve the operation, the reliability and the quality of PV components and systems. Operational data from PV systems in different climate zones compiled within the project will help provide the basis for estimates of the current situation regarding PV reliability and performance.

The general setting of Task 13 provides a common platform to summarize and report on technical aspects affecting the quality, performance, reliability and lifetime of PV systems in a wide variety of environments and applications. By working together across national boundaries we can all take advantage of research and experience from each member country and combine and integrate this knowledge into valuable summaries of best practices and methods for ensuring PV systems perform at their optimum and continue to provide competitive return on investment.

Task 13 has so far managed to create the right framework for the calculations of various parameters that can give an indication of the quality of PV components and systems. The framework is now there and can be used by the industry who has expressed appreciation towards the results included in the high-quality reports.

The IEA PVPS countries participating in Task 13 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States of America.

DISCLAIMER

The IEA PVPS TCP is organised under the auspices of the International Energy Agency (IEA) but is functionally and legally autonomous. Views, findings and publications of the IEA PVPS TCP do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the IEA Secretariat or its individual member countries.

COVER PICTURE

In the back, inspection of a PV power plant after a severe storm. Photo curtesy of TÜV Rheinland.

In the front, practices of risk quantification divided into an adapted rating system by SUPSI/Sinclair, analysis methods and mitigation by TÜV Rheinland.

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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER SYSTEMS PROGRAMME

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Quantification of Technical Risks in PV Power Systems

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Alternating Current
AHP	Analytic Hierarchy Process
BYT	Bypass Diode testing
CAPEX	Capital Expenditures
CPL	Component Power Loss
CPN	Cost Priority Number
D	Detectability
DC	Direct Current
dIV	Dark I-V Measurement
EL	Electroluminescence
EPC	Engineering, Procurement, Construction
FMEA	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FTA	Fault Tree Analysis
IEA	International Energy Agency
INS	Insulation Testing
IRT	Infrared Thermography
I-V	Current-Voltage
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LCOE	Levelised Cost of Electricity
LeTID	Light and elevated temperature induced degradation
LID	Light induced degradation
MCDA	Multi Criteria Decision Analysis
MDT	Mean Down Time
MM	Mitigation Measure
MON	Data Monitoring
MTTF	Mean Time To Failure
NPV	Net Present Value
0	Occurrence
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OPEX	Operational Expenditures
PDF	Probability Density Function
PID	Potential Induced Degradation
PMBOK	Project Management Body of Knowledge
PLR	Performance Loss Rate
PR	Performance Ratio
PV	Photovoltaic



PVDS	PV Failure Degradation Sheet
PVFS	PV Failure Fact Sheet
PVPS	PV Power Systems
RAM	Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability
RBD	Reliability Block Diagram
RDB	Risk Database
RPN	Risk Priority Number
S	Severity
SRD	Statistical Risk Data
STL	Seasonal-Trend Decomposition using LOESS
STM	Signal Transmission Method
STM UV	Signal Transmission Method Ultra Violet
-	0



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Photovoltaic (PV) risk analysis serves to identify and reduce the risks associated with investments in PV projects. The key challenge in reacting to failures or avoiding them at a reasonable cost is the ability to quantify and manage the various risks. There are several interpretations of the concept of risk, but in general risk can be defined as the probability of failure multiplied by the consequences of its failure.

Best practice guidelines to improve the operation of PV power systems are often only applied as long as the recommended actions have advantages for the executors, the Engineering, Procurement, Construction (EPC) and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) companies and for the investors whose main interests focus on low risks and maximum profit from an economic point of view. This leads to the key question: How can you demonstrate the effectiveness of measures and justify their application? Because the technical best solution is not always the economic best solution. And before you are able to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio, the following question arises: How to quantify the basic impact of technical risks on performance and reliability?

In a first approach we reviewed scientific literature and technical reports to compare and assess the common practices for quantifying the impact of technical risks. Limitations and challenges were compiled and selection criteria defined for the four methods:

- a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
- b) Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)
- c) Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) analysis
- d) Cost Priority Number (CPN) method

The advantages and disadvantages of these methods are demonstrated considering the factors maturity level and data availability, and as well an overview of common risk mitigation measures is given.

The second part deals with 30 PV Failure Fact Sheets (PVFS) annexed to this report which summarise some of the most important aspects to know about single failures. The target audience for these PVFSs are PV planners, installers, investors, independent experts and insurance companies or anyone interested in a brief description of failures with examples, an estimation of risks and suggestions of how to intervene or prevent these failures. Besides the PVFS collection we used a PV Failure Degradation Sheet (PVDS) as introduced in [1]. These requires much more detailed measured input data but are able to provide statistics on degradation rates and power loss of PV systems based on failure types. Compared to the survey structure in [1] we added two new failure categories for PV modules: Light and elevated temperature induced degradation (LeTID) and potential induced delamination.

These statistics serve as a basis for risk models, such as the CPN method [2] [3], which are used to assess the associated risk and the economic impact over the project-lifetime of a PV plant. In addition to the knowledge of the individual risks, the economic impact of these risks are driving factors for further analysis and decisions. In a final step the costs of mitigation measures are included in a cost-benefit analysis in order to derive the best strategy from a technical and financial perspective.

The revised CPN approach is presented through an exemplary calculation of individual CPN values. The CPN approach was applied to 191 maintenance tickets of a PV plant located in



central Italy which is in operation since 2013. The maintenance tickets were analysed manually, corresponding to all the planned and corrective activities carried out in 2018 for the example plant. The improved CPN methodology has been applied manually to this case study, which led to important improvements, especially in terms of the structure and standardisation of the CPN table. We conclude that the development of an automated, and therefore time-efficient, solution for extracting key parameters from maintenance tickets is of vital importance for the implementation of this methodology at the portfolio level, and thus, to gain statistical insights from a large number of PV plants.

In a second case study the CPN method was also applied to a 10 MWp PV plant. As one of the main risks for the PV modules, potential induced degradation (PID) was selected. Taking Capital Expenditures (CAPEX), Operational Expenditures (OPEX) and annual revenues into account, the project's financial profit after 20 years of operation was 48% below original expectations. Considering the additional costs of mitigation measures, the loss on the cumulated financial income after 20 years of operation could be kept at only 5% - 6% below the originally expected profit.

Cleaning routines for PV power systems in desert regions are a typical corrective measure to reduce energy yield losses due to soiling. The impact of different cleaning procedures on the soiling losses over one year are calculated and shown for a 10 MWp PV plant near Abu Dhabi. In the case of periodic (monthly) cleaning, annual energy losses due to soiling are reduced from 30% to 4% including the costs of 12 cleaning routines. The best economic results are achieved with "triggered cleaning" at a soiling loss of 5%, even if 20 cleaning routines per year are required. The calculations showed how it is possible to determine the best economic solution for a specific PV plant, loss scenario and mitigation approach.

With the provided overview of quantification methods, we draw the conclusion that more standardisation is required. Risk definitions are not fully structured and event databases (solar logbooks) are not harmonised. The development of a software tool for field technicians is recommended that would allow the precise and error-free recording of standardised parameters for the calculation of the O&M contractor's Key Performance Indicators (KPI) necessary for efficient implementation of the methodology [4]. In summary the O&M field practices must certainly move away from the manual input of tickets in text format and adopt a more standardised approach where human intervention is limited.

All things considered, we believe that the data-driven evaluation and modelling of techno-economic performance indicators is a significant key to take decision support on Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) to the next level.



1 INTRODUCTION

Technical risks are important criteria to be considered when investing in new and existing PV installations. Quantitative knowledge of these risks is one of the key factors for the multiple types of stakeholders, such as asset managers, banks or project developers, to define reliable business decisions before and during the operation of their PV assets.

While multiple interpretations of the concept of risk exist, it is generally agreed that risk can be defined as the probability of failures multiplied by the consequences of these failures. The common approach in evaluating technical risks is to apply a classical FMEA [5]. It is widely used in the automotive, aerospace, and electronics industries to identify, rank, and mitigate potential failures. Root cause and impact of a failure can be analysed. The disadvantage of this approach is that the risk is evaluated in a qualitative way and cannot provide a framework for the calculation of the economic impact. Thus, a cost-based FMEA was proposed in 1993 [6] and enhanced in 2003 [5]. Several applications of cost-based FMEA can be found in the literature [7], often related to automotive or wind energy [8].

In 2017, a cost-based FMEA was presented within the Solar Bankability Project [9] as a first attempt to implement a cost-based FMEA to the PV sector. The metric CPN was applied as one KPI for the risk assessment of PV investments. In [4], the CPN method was further developed with the focus on the needs of large O&M operators. Other publications [10] [11] discussed the topic from a reliability perspective. As by definition, if you enhance the reliability of the system's components, the overall system risk is reduced.

The aim of this report is to increase the knowledge of methodologies to assess technical risks and mitigation measures in terms of their economic impact and effectiveness during operation & maintenance and to investigate the most important risks by collecting case studies and updating the database with the acquired information. Based on results from previous work yield assessments for new projects [12], monitored loss rates for existing power plants [13] [14] and the relevant financial parameters [15] decisively determine the impact of technical risks on Net Present Value and the Levelised Cost of Electricity.

In Chapter 2, common practices for quantifying the impact of technical risks were compared and a list of recommended mitigation measures tailored to the identified risks and the status of the PV plant is developed. After a first review of the scientific literature and technical reports, the limitations and challenges are compiled, and selection criteria defined.

Chapter 3 deals with the systematical approach to identify the main technical risks and collect these failure, loss and occurrence data from previous IEA PVPS Task 13 reports [16] [1]. These statistics can then serve as the basis for risk models which are used to assess the associated risk and the economic impact over the project-lifetime of a PV plant. In addition to the knowledge of the individual risks, the economic impact of these risks are the driving factors for further analysis and decisions.

In Chapter 4, real case studies are introduced. The costs of mitigation measures are included in a cost-benefit analysis in order to derive the best strategy from a technical and financial perspective.



2 COMMON PRACTICE FOR QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF TECHNICAL RISKS

According to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) guide, a set of standard terminology and guidelines for project management [17], "Risk quantification is a process to evaluate identified risks to produce data that can be used in deciding a response to corresponding risks". This implies that the first step is to identify the technical risks and subsequently determine the probability of occurrence and the impact on the energy yield. Previous works within IEA PVPS Task 13 [16] [1], Moser et al. [2] and the PV failures fact sheet in Chapter 3.1 have identified and described the most common technical failures that could impact the performance of a PV power plant. In addition to failures, there are also other technical risks during operation caused by varying performance loss rates as analysed in [18] [14]. How to respond to these risks with preventive or corrective actions is discussed by Jahn et al. in [3] and [19]. In the following, these evaluation processes are classified into semi-quantitative and quantitative methods with a focus on photovoltaics. This chapter gives an insight into common methods used, how technical risks in PV plants can be evaluated and minimised, and provides recommendations for best practices.

2.1 Key Definitions

While there are specific parameters for each quantification method, this chapter presents the recurring indicators typically used in contracts in the PV sector (s. Figure 1). Further definitions can be found in the Task 13 report [12] or [20].

Technical risk: The probability of problems multiplied by the consequences of its failure.

Reliability: The probability that a component performs its intended function

Energy Yield: The electrical energy generated by a power plant.

Yield Loss: Not-generated energy caused by a problem.

Failure rate: It indicates how many objects fail on average in a period of time.

Detection time: How long a problem exists before it is noticed.

Response time: Time between when the problem is detected and the corrective action starts.

Resolution time (repair time): time to resolve the fault from the moment of reaching the plant.




Figure 1: Parameters to calculate the O&M contractor KPIs, extracted from the monitoring and ticketing system [19].



2.2 Semi-Quantitative Methods (FMEA, MCDA)


These semi-quantitative methods use human problem-solving strategies, based on expert knowledge and expert opinion. The best ways to use such a knowledge-based method is to conduct on- or offline workshops where experts can discuss and consequently assign values to the risks identified. They can prioritise the identified risks using a pre-defined rating scale. Risks will be scored based on their probability or likelihood of occurrence and their impact.

2.2.1 FMEA

One typical approach is a classic Failure Modes and Effects Analysis [21]. In the FMEA, each identified risk is evaluated for its Severity (S), Occurrence (O) and Detectability (D).

$$RPN = S \cdot O \cdot D \tag{1}$$

With the resulting Risk Priority Number (RPN) the evaluated risk can be ranked and compared with other risks. Figure 2 gives an example of FMEA rating of PV module failures. The disadvantage of this approach is that further usage, i.e. within a financial model, is limited [2].



FMEA Rating of PV Module Failures

Figure 2: Example of rating of PV module failures based on classic FMEA. The rating of the technical risks was based on the statistics of failure reports from TÜV Rheinland. RPN is the product of S, O and D where each factor is an integer between 0 and 10 [2].


2.2.2 MCDA

Another class of methods is the Multi Criteria Decision Analysis [22]. MCDA methods use relationships such as priority, outranking and distance between the criteria. It is similar to FMEA; however, it solves the biased subjective ranking within FMEA, as each single variable is additionally weighted.

One MCDA known for robustness is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method developed by Saaty [23]. It is based on three principles: building hierarchies, priority and logical consistency. Priorities are absolute numbers between 0 and 1 and always add up to 1. Figure 3



shows the calculated priorities to determine the optimal location for a large PV plant in southern Iran [24].



MCDA AHP Priorities for Site Selection

Figure 3: Example of AHP priorities to determine the optimal PV plant location in southern Iran. The sum of all priorities is equal to 1. Adapted from [24].

2.3 Quantitative Methods (CPN, RAM)

Quantitative Methods involve assessing the probability and impact of risks using numerically based techniques, such as simulation and fault tree analysis. The results provide information about the effects of the identified risks and represent a given reality in the form of a numerical value that can be utilized in economic and financial models for quantitative decision making.

2.3.1 Cost Priority Number (CPN)


In this sub-section, the CPN methodology, a method originally developed for PV systems in the H2020 project Solar Bankability [9], is discussed.

CPN was developed in the early 2000's to address the fact that FMEA was unable to be used for quantitative financial assessments. Therefore Cost-based FMEA was proposed. The FMEA community had already developed the Risk Priority Number (RPN). When full lifecycle analysis [25] of large projects such as the "Next Linear Collider" were being designed and priced, full lifecycle costs, considering not just construction, but O&M, repairs and loss of production time, and FMEA needed to be taken into account [26]. In 2003 [27] this was formalized as Cost-based FMEA [5], as an extension of the RPN used previously [7]. And in the ensuing years the utility of connecting FMEA to lifecycle costs and financial decision making was introduced in many engineering fields [8] [28], with Kahrobaee et al. [29] introducing CPN in a lifecycle and FMEA analysis of wind turbine systems.

For PV systems CPN enables accurate economic quantification of PV degradation modes and other performance impairing effects of operating PV plants. It therefore has enabled risk as-



sessments of investments in PV power plant projects [2]. The CPN methodology used assessed the economic impact of PV projects based on factors such as performance loss and downtime. Thereby, a cost-based Failure Mode and Effect Analysis methodology for the PV sector has been developed in form of the CPN. In its initial form, it was developed using theoretical scenarios to calculate extreme values for the CPN metric, expressed in €/kWp/year (see Figure 4). Thereby, all phases of a PV power plant's life cycle (from product testing to decommissioning) have been included. The methodology helps to identify and classify technical risks and their economic impact by assigning a cost metric that, based on collected statistics, supports preventive and corrective measures, which would then lower the impact of failures on the availability and performance of a PV plant. Thereby, it was possible to create a database which gives indicators of failure appearance likeliness and severity. Such results could then be used to improve O&M activities.





An important improvement of the methodology was the integration of monitoring data to calculate realistic CPN values for individual PV system performance impairments [4]. Thereby, the focus is on the operation and maintenance (O&M) phase which is by far the longest one in the life cycle of a PV plant (20-25 years). Real monitoring data were used, and information was extracted from maintenance tickets to improve the accuracy of the methodology by stepping away from theoretical assumptions. In order to calculate the cost due to the performance impairment arising from a system failure, the downtime is divided into time intervals defined in Chapter 2.1 [20]. According to the CPN methodology, costs related to the appearance of specific failures can be calculated as:

$$CPN\left[\frac{\epsilon}{kWp}\right] = C_{down} + C_{fix}$$
(2)

$$PR_{fail}[\%] = PR_{start,mon} - PLR * (year_{fail} - year_{start,mon})$$
(3)

$$Y_{loss} \left[kWh/kW_{p} \right] = H_{loss} \cdot PR_{fail}$$
(4)

$$E_{loss_detection} = Y_{loss_detection} \cdot P_0 \cdot \left(\frac{n_{fail}}{n_{total}}\right) \cdot CPL \cdot M_1$$
(5)

$$E_{loss_response} = Y_{loss_response} \cdot P_0 \cdot \left(\frac{n_{fail}}{n_{total}}\right) \cdot CPL \cdot M_1$$
(6)

$$E_{loss_repair} = (Y_{loss_repair} - Y_{loss_shutdown}) \cdot P_0 \cdot \left(\frac{n_{fail}}{n_{total}}\right) \cdot CPL \cdot M_1$$
(7)

1



$$E_{loss_shutdown} = Y_{loss_shutdown} \cdot P_0 \cdot \left(\frac{n_{fail}}{n_{total}}\right) \cdot M_2$$
(8)

$$E_{loss_{TOTAL}}[kWh] = E_{loss_{detection}} + E_{loss_{response}} + E_{loss_{repair}} + E_{loss_{shutdown}}$$
(9)

$$C_{down}[\notin/kW_p/year] = \frac{E_{loss_{TOTAL}} * FIT}{P_0}$$
(10)

$$C_{fix} \left[\text{\&/kW}_{p}/\text{year} \right] = \frac{\left(C_{det} + C_{rep/sub} + C_{trans} + C_{lab} \right) n_{fail}}{P_{0}}$$
(11)

Where

Table 1: Parameter definition for calculating CPN.

PR _{fail}	Performance Ratio when failure occurs [%]	n _{fail}	Number of components affected
PR _{start,mon}	Annual average PR calculated with the first available complete year of monitoring data	n _{total}	Total number of components
PLR	[%] Performance Loss Rate calculated using at least two years of historical data [%/year]	CPL	Component Power Loss [%]
year _{fail}	Year when failure occurs	<i>M</i> ₁	Multiplier to consider failures that cause problems at higher component level during <i>detection</i> , response and repair times (excluding shutdown time) []
year _{start,mon}	Year from which monitoring data is available	M_2	Multiplier to consider failures that cause problems at higher component level during the shutdown time []
Y _{loss}	Specific Yield Loss, energy per kW_p that the plat would have produced if unaffected by the failure $[kWh/kW_p]$	FIT	Feed in tariff [€/kWh]
H _{loss}	Irradiation loss, calculated as the sum of Plane of Array (POA) irradiation [kWh/m²]	C_{labour}	Cost of labour [€]
$E_{loss_detection}$	Energy loss during detection [kWh]	t _{repair}	Repair time [h]
$E_{loss_response}$	Energy loss during response [kWh]	n _{ST}	Number of site technicians involved in the repair activ- ity
E_{loss_repair}	Energy loss during repair [kWh]	C_{ST}	Internal cost (rate per hour) of the site technician $[{\ensuremath{\in}}/h]$
$E_{loss_shutdown}$	Energy loss during shutdown [kWh] considerers CPL=100%	C _{detect}	Cost of detection [€/component] To account for various techniques (visual inspection, IR for thermal anomalies, I-V curve tracing for power deviations, EL for cracked cells, etc.)
E _{losstotal}	Total energy loss [kWh]	C_{repair}	Cost of repair/substitution [€/component]
P_0	Total installed capacity of the PV plant $[kW_p]$	C_{transp}	Cost of transportation [€/component]

The CPN assesses the economic impact based on two factors: lost production during down-time (C_{down}) and costs related to fixing the issue at hand (C_{fix}).

C_{down} is accurately determined by evaluating the Performance Ratio (PR) at the time of the failure's appearance through the inclusion of the Performance Loss Rate (PLR). The PLR is calculated using *seasonal-trend decomposition using LOESS* (STL) [31], which was selected



based on a comparative study of available algorithms [32]. This method decomposes a timeseries into its subparts and extracts a long-term trend of PR values. This trend is then subject to linear regression and the PLR is given in percentage per year. By including the PLR, the PR was derived for the time each failure occurred, instead of assuming a fixed PR value for all the tickets for the whole period analysed.


For the calculation of the initial PR, it might be desirable to use as a starting point the PR calculated right after the commissioning of the plant or even better, some months later, when the modules' output power has stabilised.

The Component Power Loss (CPL) defines the power loss for the affected components of the PV plant. The multipliers M_1 and M_2 ensure that components at higher component level, are considered if needed. For example, a broken or stolen module affects the performance of the whole string. The division into shutdown M_2 and excluding shutdown time M_1 is important as a shutdown will affect not only one string but all strings which are connected to a combiner box which is turned off, for instance to replace a module.

This development is a cornerstone for automating the CPN methodology for use with system monitoring and maintenance ticket data of fleets of PV systems to gain qualitative as well as quantitative insights into common performance issues of PV systems. An application example follows in Chapter 4.1.1

2.3.2 Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analysis

Technical risk and the reliability of a component are complements of each other, as long as they cover the same sample space. In this context another widely used quantification method is the Reliability, Availability and Maintainability analysis. RAM analysis aims to identify any significant performance losses and then recommend improvements to the maintenance strategy. In this bottom-up approach a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) or the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is recommended to determine the effects of the failure of individual components (Figure 5).






Figure 5: Examples of Reliability Block Diagram (TOP) and Fault Tree (BOTTOM). Adapted from [11].



In RAM modelling, the reliability R is defined as the probability that a system or component performs adequately within a given time.

$$R(t) = \int_{t}^{\infty} f(t)dt$$
(12)

The probability density function PDF of failures f(t) with increasing lifetime is expressed by an exponential, normal, Weibull or lognormal distribution. Weibull distributions are applicable to a broad range of failure modes and mechanisms. The normal distribution is preferred for items that have a wear out mechanism such as bearing or motors. Derived from [33] the best-fit PDFs for the different components are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Best-fit PDFs for the components of a PV plant adapted from [33].

Component	PDF
PV modules	Exponential
Bypass diode	Weibull
DC switch	Lognormal
AC switch	Weibull
AC circuit breaker	Weibull
Connector	Exponential
Inverter	Lognormal

The failure rate λ is the frequency of component failure. The mean time to failure (MTTF) of a component defines the expected life of non-repairable items.

$$\lambda = \frac{f(t)}{R(t)} \tag{13}$$

$$MTTF = \int_0^\infty R(t)dt$$
 (14)

Availability (A) is defined as the percentage of time that the plant was successfully operating. A is MTTF divided by the total operating time and can be calculated with MTTF and Mean Down time (MDT), as follows:

$$A = \frac{MTTF}{MTTF + MDT}$$
(15)

In [33], [11] and [34] the RAM analysis was performed based on failure rates taken from the literature along with real data from PV systems' operations over a 25 year period. The reliability analysis has proven, that the expected lifetime of the PV modules records 44 years, whereas the expected lifetime of the balance of system and inverter are 19 and 8 years respectively [33]. In [11], the reliability of a string inverter is given between 8 (older devices) and 25 years (state-of-the-art inverters). The associated reliability (after 20 years), availabilities and energy losses are presented in Table 3.



Component	Reliability (after 20 years)	Availability	Energy Losses [MWh]
PV string	88.7%	99.85%	805
Combiner Box	14.4%	99.69%	1656
Inverter	0.1%	99.42%	2842
Transformer	55.6%	99.50%	2601

Table 3: Results of RAM analysis of a 15.3 MW PV plant adapted from [11].

2.4 Risk Mitigation Measures

Once technical risk, reliability and availability have been determined, mitigation measures (MM) can be assigned to reduce the associated energy losses. Jahn et al. [3] identified eight generic mitigation measures for PV technical risk management:

- **Component testing** of important plant components such as PV modules or inverters. The testing can be performed by the manufacturer in the factory, or independent testing at certified laboratory, or on-site at the PV plant;
- **Design review** and construction monitoring serve to catch issues caused by bad PV plant design and poor PV construction workmanship;
- **EPC qualification** focuses on ensuring the competencies of the field workers, e.g, by requiring certain technical qualification prerequisites or regular training of the field workers;
- Implementing advanced monitoring system for early detection and diagnosis of faults;
- Use of basic monitoring system to monitor plant level alarms and notifications;
- Advanced inspection (e. g., infrared thermographic or electroluminescence imaging) to detect defects not usually visible to the naked eye;
- Visual inspection to establish any visible changes in PV plant components;
- **Spare parts management** to minimize the costs of downtime during repair or substitution of components.

These MMs can be grouped into two main categories. Preventive measures are applied before the failure occurs to prevent it from happening. The MMs under this category are component testing, design review, construction monitoring, and EPC qualification. Corrective measures are MMs that aim to reduce higher losses and costs if the failure has already occurred. Cleaning strategies to minimize soiling losses on the PV modules are described in [18]. The following advanced inspection methods are presented in detail in [35].

- Drone-mounted electroluminescence & thermal infrared imaging of PV arrays
- Daylight I-V measurement of PV strings and PV modules
- PV module characterization with mobile PV test centre
- Dark I-V measurement of PV strings and PV modules
- PV plant testing vehicle for PV strings
- Electrical impedance spectroscopy of PV strings
- Daylight electroluminescence imaging
- UV fluorescence imaging
- Advanced outdoor photoluminescence imaging of PV modules
- Spectroscopic methods for polymeric materials



2.5 Best Practice, Limitations and Challenges

Choosing the best method for the individual purpose is rarely trivial. The advantages, and disadvantages of the presented methods are demonstrated considering the factors maturity level and data availability and are illustrated in Figure 6.

FMEA is based on the opinions of experts defining occurrence and severity of events. The ranking within an FMEA is subjective and further use of RPNs, e.g. within a financial model, is limited. It is usually applied during the early phase of the project, when new products or strategies are implemented. It is best suited for immature technologies when operational data is limited and no sufficient previous experience is available.

MCDA evaluates the performance of alternative courses of action. Its strong advantage is its ability to capture both subjective and objective information, however weights and values are difficult to estimate and it can results into skewness of results due to extreme values. It is best suited for technologies at a relatively low maturity level where operational data and sufficient previous experience is available.

CPN assesses the economic impact based on factors such as performance reduction and down-time. It is based on statistical analysis and real-time data and can be applied to a single PV plant or to a large portfolio of PV plants. It is best suited for technologies at a high level of maturity where operational data and sufficient previous experience is available.

RAM analysis identifies significant causes of loss of availability or issues that limit the energy yield. It starts during the early phase of the project and can be reviewed and updated as the project progresses. It is best suited for mature technologies but in the case where operational data is limited and insufficient previous experience is available, such as for young PV power plants.




Figure 6: Selection guide of methods presented based on the driving-factors: data availability and level of technology maturity.



3 RISK DATABASE

According to the PMBOK guide [17], the Risk Database (RDB) is the central repository for all information regarding the identified risks. In terms of technical risks the RDB provides the range of affected components the description with causes and consequences, failure rates, the probability of occurrence, the impact on KPIs and the recommended control and mitigation actions. It should be updated and maintained as a growing data hub through all phases of the project. In this chapter we present a systematic approach to identify the main technical risks, define the most important risk parameters and collect these failure, loss and occurrence data.

3.1 PV Failure Fact Sheets (PVFS)

The PV failure fact sheets (PVFS, Annex 1) summarise some of the most important aspects of single failures. The target audience of these PVFSs are PV planners, installers, investors, independent experts and insurance companies, and anyone interested in a brief description of failures with examples, an estimation of risks and suggestions of how to intervene or prevent these failures.

The failure sheets do not aim to deepen the theoretical background of the failures and its detection, but they aim to summarise the key aspects described in the numerous IEA PVPS Task 13 technical reports [1] [16] [18] [36] [35] and reference documents [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] used for the preparation of the PVFSs shown in Table 4. The failure sheets are specific to the component in which they occur.

3.1.1 PVFS structure

The format of the PVFS is based on the failure description presented within the H2020 Solar Bankability project [9]. A rating system for the estimation of the severity of a failure is used here which simplifies the approach proposed within the IEA PVPS Task 13 [16] by implementing the rating system proposed by the Sinclairs [37]. The correlation between the different failures is highlighted in the text by using bold characters. Each PVFS is structured into 1 to 3 pages. The first page is a descriptive page, whereas the remaining pages contain examples composed of a picture, a legend and an estimation about its severity. The first page is structured as follows:

Component

The PV system components are divided into:

- (1) PV module (including junction box)
- (2) Cables and interconnectors (at module, string and combiner box level)
- (3) Mounting (structure, clamps and screws)
- (4) Inverter

Defect

Short name describing the failure/defect.

Appearance

Description of how the defect looks like.



No	Component	Failure name
1-1	PV module	Cell cracks
1-2	PV module	Discolouration of encapsulant or backsheet
1-3	PV module	Front delamination
1-4	PV module	Backsheet delamination
1-5	PV module	Backsheet cracking
1-6	PV module	Backsheet chalking (whitening)
1-7	PV module	Burn marks
1-8	PV module	Glass breakage
1-9	PV module	Cell interconnection failure
1-10	PV module	Potential induced degradation
1-11	PV module	Metallisation discolouration/corrosion
1-12	PV module	Glass corrosion or abrasion
1-13	PV module	Defect or detached junction box
1-14	PV module	Junction box interconnection failure
1-15	PV module	Missing or insufficient bypass diode protection
1-16	PV module	Not conform power rating
1-17	PV module	Light induced degradation in c-Si modules
1-18	PV module	Insulation failure
1-19	PV module	Hot spot (thermal patterns)
1-20	PV module	Soiling
2-1	Cable and Interconnector	DC connector mismatch
2-2	Cable and Interconnector	Defect DC connector/cable
2-3	Cable and Interconnector	Insulation failure
2-4	Cable and Interconnector	Thermal damage in combiner box
3-1	Mounting	Bad module clamping
3-2	Mounting	Inappropriate/defect mounting structure
3-3	Mounting	Module shading
4-1	Inverter	Overheating (temperature derating)
4-2	Inverter	Incorrect installation
4-3	Inverter	Complete failure (not operating)

Table 4: List of PV Failure Fact Sheets.

The list does not pretend to be exhaustive or updated. The complete list with all PVFS can be downloaded under [48]



Detection

Description of methods which can be used to detect the failure. Detection methods in brackets lists secondary methods, which do not detect the failure with absolute certainty or which can be used in addition to other methods. Following abbreviations are used:

Abbreviation	Detection Methods
VI	Visual inspection
IRT	Infrared thermography
EL	Electroluminescence
IV	Daylight I-V measurement
UV	UV fluorescence
STM	Signal transmission method
MON	Data monitoring
dIV	Dark I-V measurement
BYT	Bypass diode testing
VOC	V _{oc} measurement
INS	Insulation testing

Table 5: Abbreviations of Detection Methods.

Origin

Description of the failure and its main causes and origin (1. Material and production, 2. Transport and installation, 3. Operation and maintenance).

Impact

Description of the impact on the safety, performance and reliability of the component and system and its severity. For every failure, a range of possible ratings is given, one for the safety and one for the performance.

A failure is defined as a safety failure when it endangers somebody who is applying or working with PV modules or simply passing the PV modules. Three categories are defined in Figure 7.

Safety category	Description
	Failure has no effect on safety.
f e m	Failure may cause a fire (f), electrical shock (e) or a physical dan- ger (m) if a follow-up failure and/or a second failure occurs.
f e m	Failure can directly cause a fire (f), electrical shock (e) or a physical danger (m).

Figure 7: Safety category



A failure is defined as a performance failure when it impacts the performance and/or reliability of a system. Five categories are defined in Figure 8. They go from 1 (low severity) to 5 (high severity).

Performance category	Description
	The defect has no direct effect on performance.
	The defect has a minor impact on performance.
	The defect has a moderate impact on performance.
	The defect has a high impact on performance.
1 5	The defect has a catastrophic impact on performance.

Figure 8: Performance category

For each category, the expected loss is estimated on the component level and if no mitigation measure is implemented. It can range from no power degradation (0%) over power degradation below detection limit (<2-3%), power degradation within warranty (<0.7-1%/year) and power degradation out warranty (>0.7-1%/year) to catastrophic power degradation (>3%/year).

Mitigation

Description of the corrective actions to be done on a short and medium term when detecting a failure and preventive actions to be implemented to avoid the failure from the beginning. Preventive actions are separated into recommended actions, representing the minimum requirement for small residential systems and optional actions for large scale systems.

The general rule for intervention in case of a failure is: All components with a direct safety risk or a performance severity of 5, highlighted in red, should be replaced or repaired. Regular inspections should be performed to monitor the status of the not replaced or repaired components.

3.1.2 Example PVFS: Front delamination

The delamination of the encapsulant **FS1-3: Front delamination** is here taken as example to further explain the FS structure and rating system.



Component	Module				PVFS
Defect	Front delamination				
Appearance	Any local separation of the layers between (i) the front glass and the encapsulant or (ii) the cell and the encapsulant, visible as bubbles or as bright, milky area/s. It may appear continuous or in spots. The position and size of the delamination or bubble depends on the origin and progress of the failure.				
Detection	VI, (INS)				
Origin	The adhesion between the glamany reasons. Typically, it is a short lamination times, too h glass, incompatibility of EV, environmental factors (e.g. figenerally followed by moistur hot and humid conditions.	caused by the r igh pressure in A with solder chermal stress	nanufacturing proo the laminator, cor ing flux, inadequa es, external mech	cess (e.g. poor cross lin ntaminations, improper ate storage of the ra anical stresses, UV).	king of EVA, too r cleaning of the aw material) or Delamination is
	Production	Installatio	n 🗌	Operation	
Impact	Delamination or bubbles do not automatically pose a safety issue, but they can result in reduced insulation of the component and increased safety risk when they form a continuous path between electric circuit and the edge due to possible water ingress. Moisture in the module will decrease performance due to an increase of series resistance, affect long term reliability and in some cases also the structural integrity of the module. Moreover, delamination at interfaces in the optical path will result in additional optical reflection and subsequent decrease in current. This can be the origin of current mismatch. If the mismatch is significant, it will trigger the bypass diode and cause further power loss. The inverter might also shut down due to leakage current's leading to a further performance loss. Manufacturing related delamination issues often affects a relevant percentage of modules within the same production batch and consequentially has a big impact on system performance.				is path between le will decrease some cases also optical path will be the origin of nd cause further ng to a further nt percentage of
	Safety:		Performance:	1 2 3 4 5	
Mitigation	Corrective actions		Preventive actions (recommended)		ns
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should replaced. Regular inspections should be done to monitor th status of the not replaced modules. In case of individual module testing all modules which failed the insulation and/or wet-leakage test shou be replaced.	be certificati fault dete e other dev	dity of IEC 61215 on and BOM, groun ction by inverter o ices at all time.		nent inspections g level of EVA)

Figure 9: First page of PVFS example with general information






Figure 10: Remaining pages of a PVFS contain examples composed of a picture, a legend and an estimation about its severity.

The first section of the sheet describes the **appearance** or how to recognise a specific failure and which **detection** methods are available. Delamination is generally easily detectable by visual inspection (VI) of the modules from the front. Insulation measurements (INS) can give a hint of a severe delamination, but it is not the first method to detect an early delamination, reason why it is put in brackets.

The second section describes the **origin** or in which phase of the lifetime of a PV system the failure occurs and what the main causes are. Delamination problems have its origin mainly in the quality of the raw material, the manufacturing process and/or the environmental factors to which the modules are exposed during its operational lifetime. Transport and installation do not generate any delamination problems.

The third section describes the **impact** the failure has on the safety and performance of the component and PV system. Below the general description the severity rating accord. Figure 7 and Figure 8 is given. The severity rating in the first page gives the full range of possible ratings observable in the field and how the failure can evolve over the whole lifetime of a PV system. The rating in the examples gives instead a snapshot of the gravity of the failure for a specific case at a certain time. The pictures are taken from literature or case studies and give only a partial picture of the situation and are here used to explain the potential levels of impact.

The delamination of the potting material does not automatically pose a **safety risk.** It is therefore often rated as not critical (see example 1.3.1-1.3.7, 1.3.10 and 13.11 in Annex 1), but depending on the propagation of the failure it can develop into a more severe safety failure.



When creating a continuous path between the electric circuit and the edge of the module (see example 1.3.13-1.3.15), delamination can lead to electric leakage currents with a direct risk of electrical shock or the risk can occur later, due to the progress of the delamination and/or the ingress of moisture. This is particularly the case when the original delamination is close to the edge of the module or the junction box, or if it is going over a very extended area (see example 1.3.8-1.3.12). The performance loss risk for modules with delamination problems ranges from 1 to 5. Very small delamination areas on top of a cell or outside the cell area and not combined with other failures, are classified as having no impact (1) or a minor power loss typically below the detection limit (2), if the failure is not increasing over time (see example 1.3.1-1.3.4, 1.3.8, 1.3.10 and 1.3.11). The severity is in the range of (2-4) when the delamination area is getting larger (see example 1.3.7 and 1.3.9) or if it is occurring in combination with follow-up failures like moisture ingress (see example 1.3.14) or an insulation failure (see example 1.3.13). It increases also when occurring in combination with a second failure like discoloration (yellowing or browning) of the encapsulant or backsheet (see example 1.3.6, 1.3.7, 1.3.13), or cell cracking (see example 1.3.5). A catastrophic performance loss of (5) is reached when the cell mismatch is so large that one or more bypass diodes could be activated (see example 1.3.13 and 1.3.14).

The last section describes the **mitigation** measures. In case of delamination, all modules which do not guarantee anymore the electrical safety or insulation resistance or have an active bypass diode, have to be replaced. Not replaced modules with minor delamination have to be monitored by regular visual inspections and ground fault detection. Basic preventive measures consist in selecting certified and tested products only. In case of large-scale systems regular system inspection is recommended.

3.2 PV Failure Degradation Sheets (PVDS)

Besides the PVFS collection we provide an update on the statistical risk data of the PV Failure Degradation Sheet (PVDS) survey developed in Koentges et al. [1]. It requires much more detailed measured input data but it is able to generate statistical data on degradation rates and power loss of PV systems based on failure types. Due to the high requirements on the PVDS much less input data can be collected. In the following, we introduce the collected data, the way of analysing the data and the analysis results.

3.2.1 Introduction of PVDS

The failure data is collected in an excel sheet which is sent to system owner, experts installer or manufacturer. Some data is also collected by scientific publications or an Australian internet survey. The survey structure is first presented in the IEA PVPS TASK 13 report "Assessment of Photovoltaic Module Failures in the Field" [1], see also Figure 11. The plain survey and the survey explanation can be downloaded here [49] [47]. The survey is structured into system components, as described in Chapter 3.1. All system components may have various predefined failures. For each failure, a power loss and a safety failure may be given. Furthermore, for each system a Koeppen-Geiger climate zone must be selected. The Koeppen-Geiger climate zones shift during the ongoing climate change. We used the Koeppen-Geiger map calculated by Rubel [50] for the time period 1976-2000 as classification classes.

Compared to the first presented survey structure in [1], we added two new failure categories for PV modules: LID/LeTID degradation and potential induced delamination [51]. Furthermore, it is now possible to add all three letters of the Koeppen-Geiger classification to the survey compared to one in the first version. The translation tool for "geo data" to "Koeppen-Geiger climate zones" [52] helps to find the correct classification for each position in the world.



PV system basics				Goal of this survey	How to start ?	Other questions
System ID:		iterator i counts System IDs	PV module ty	ре		
Source of data			Inverter type			
Country			Mounting syst	tem type		
Climate zone				substructure & module	frames/conductor	
Special stress			Other system	component		
Kind of system			Nominal syste	em power	[kW]	P _i
Orientation			Date of syste	m start	[MM/YYYY]	T _{a,i}
Inclination			Date of failure	e documented here	[MM/YYYY]	T _{b,i}
Comment if a field is orange						
Integral data	Following fail	ure specifications are based	on invostigato	d porcontago of		
	-	Cable and interconnector	PV module		Other	Comment
Total system power loss	Inverter			Mounting		Comment
[%]					F0/ 1	
<u> </u>	[/0]	[%]	[%]	[%]	[%]	
	[70]	[70]	[%] Уi	[%]	[%]	
				[%]		=1
Failure specification for	Z _{i,x,1}	% of the system	y _i		k	=1
	z _{i,x,1} Failure 1	% of the system Power loss 1	y _i Failure 2	Power loss 2		=1 Safety failure 2
Failure specification for Failed system part	z _{i,x,1} Failure 1 specification	% of the system Power loss 1	y _i		k	
Failure specification for	z _{i,x,1} Failure 1	% of the system Power loss 1 [%] No detectable loss	Yi Failure 2 specification	Power loss 2 [%]	k Safety failure 1	Safety failure 2
Failure specification for Failed system part Inverter	Z _{i,x,1} Failure 1 specification No failure	% of the system Power loss 1 [%]	Yi Failure 2 specification No failure	Power loss 2 [%] No detectable loss	k Safety failure 1 No failure	Safety failure 2
Failure specification for Failed system part Inverter Cable and interconnector	Z _{i,x,1} Failure 1 specification No failure	% of the system Power loss 1 [%] No detectable loss No detectable loss	y _i Failure 2 specification No failure No failure	Power loss 2 [%] No detectable loss No detectable loss	k Safety failure 1 No failure No failure	Safety failure 2 No failure No failure
Failure specification for Failed system part Inverter Cable and interconnector PV module	z _{i.x,1} Failure 1 specification No failure No failure x	% of the system Power loss 1 [%] No detectable loss No detectable loss ΔP _{i,x,1}	y _i Failure 2 specification No failure No failure No failure	Power loss 2 [%] No detectable loss No detectable loss No detectable loss	k Safety failure 1 No failure No failure No failure	Safety failure 2 No failure No failure No failure

Figure 11: Top rows of the PVDS excel sheet for the failure collection. The symbols in the fields illustrate the source of the data for the calculation of degradation values. For the sake of clarity, only indicated here for the evaluation of module failures.

3.2.2 Introduction of statistical evaluation

The calculation of basic degradation values is done as described in [15]. Table 6 lists all calculated basic degradation values and input variables. Figure 11 shows the corresponding value sources of the data in the excel sheet.

Table 6: Description and calculation of degradation values from input values of the PVDS survey.

Description of value	Symbol	Unit	Calculation or source of value
Data number	i		Anonymized iteration number of data "System ID"
Failure specification for system part k in system i	k		There are 5 sections in the data sheet were a failure can be specified. "k" is the iteration number of the section.
Failure type	Х		Data "Failure specification"
Nominal power of a sys- tem i	Pi	kWp	Data "Nominal system power"
By failure x affected sys- tem part of system i for part k of the system	$Z_{i,x,k}$	% of the total nominal system power	Data "Failure specification for " _% "of the system" for part k of the system i
By failure x affected sys- tem part of system i	Z _{i,x}	% of the total nominal system power	$z_{i,x} = \sum z_{i,x,k}$ Sum over all sections k having an entry for failure x



System part of system i being analysed for fail- ures. System parts are given for the system components: Inverter, Cable and intercon- nector, PV modules, mounting and other sys- tem components	Уi	% of the total nominal system power	Data given in "Following failure specifications are based on in- vestigated percentage of" for each system component
Power loss for a speci- fied failure x in system I for part k of the system	∆P _{i,x,k}	% of the nomi- nal component power	Data given in "Power loss 1" or "Power loss 2" for a failure x in system I for part k in the system
Date of the failure docu- mentation	$T_{b,i}$	date	Data "Date of failure docu- mented here"
Commissioning date of system	T _{a,i}	data	Data "Date of system start"
Number of x type failures in the survey.	Nx		n_x amount of systems in the survey with the failure x
Mean power loss for a specified failure x in system i.	$\Delta i, x$	% of the nomi- nal power of the investigated system part	$\Delta i, x = \sum \Delta P_{i,x,k} *_{Z_{i,x,k}/Z_{i,x}}$ Sum over all sections k in data set i having an entry for failure x
Degradation rate of a specific module failure type x of dataset i.	$d_{\mathrm{i,x}}$	% of the nomi- nal power of the investigated system part	$d_{i,x} = \Delta i, x / (\tau b, i - \tau a, i)$
Degradation rate of the whole system for the fail- ure type x for dataset i. It is expected that the in- vestigated part of the system is representative for the whole system.	$\delta_{i,x}$	% of the nomi- nal power of the investigated system	$\delta_{i,x} = d_{i,x} z_{i,x} / y_i$
Mean degradation rate of a specific module failure type x.	$\overline{d_x}$	% of the nomi- nal power of the investigated system part	$\overline{d_x} = \sum d_{i,x}/n_x$
Number of datasets i with the failure type x in the whole dataset or in a specific part of the data set (e.g., restricted to a climate zone).	n _x		$n_x=\sum f(i,x)$ with f(i,x)=1 if dataset has an documented failure x, otherwise, f(i,x)=0
Mean degradation rate of the whole system for the failure type x.	$\overline{\delta_x}$	% of the nomi- nal power of the investigated system	$\overline{\delta_x} = \sum \delta_{i,x} / n_x$



Percent of the investi- gated system power $p_{i,x}$ affected by a power loss after a sudden event x for system i. It is ex- pected that the investi- gated part of the system is representative for the whole system.	<i>p</i> _{<i>i</i>,<i>x</i>}	% of the investi- gated system equivalent to % of the total system	$p_{i,x}=z_{i,x}/y_i$
Power loss relative to the investigated system power. It is expected that the investigated part of the system is repre- sentative for the whole system.	$\pi_{i,x}$	% of the power of the investi- gated system equivalent to % of the power of the total sys- tem	$\pi_{i,x} = \Delta_{i,x} p_{i,x}$

The evaluation of the failure date is based on several assumptions. It is assumed that the person who documented a failure in the database analysed a representative part of the PV system. Therefore, we assume that we can extrapolate the failure impact x of the investigate system part (y_i) to the total system (P_i). The data are stored in monthly resolution in the database. The analysis is done on a yearly resolution. Failures occurring in the first year of system power production are categorised into year 1 and so on for the following years of operation. We do not know the progress of most of the failures with time. However, many studies show that especially module-based failures proceed somewhat linearly. Therefore, we calculate degradation rates from the database with the assumption that the power degrades linearly ($d_{i,x}, \delta_{i,x}$ and the respective mean values) with time. Furthermore, there are failures which are expected to be sudden events. In this case we calculate the system part which is affected by the failure ($p_{i,x}$) and the resulting power loss relative to the total system power ($\pi_{i,xx}$) and their corresponding mean values. The following listings shows to which power loss categories the failure types are assigned.

Linear degradation profile: Delamination, defect backsheet, defect junction box, junction box detached, frame breakage/bown/defect, discolouring of pottant, cell cracks, burn marks, potential induced shunts (often named PID), potential induced corrosion (often with thin-film modules), potential induced delamination, LID/LeTID degradation, disconnected cell or string interconnect ribbon, defective bypass diode/wrong dimensioned, corrosion/abrasion of AR coating, isolation failure, CdTe: back contact degradation

Sudden power loss: Glass breakage, hail -> glass breakage/cell breakage, snow load -> deformed frame/glass- /cell-breakage, Storm -> deformed frame/glass-/cell-breakage, direct lightning stroke -> defect glass/frame and defect bypass diodes, animal -> bite/corrosion/dirt, biofilm soiling, dust soiling

3.2.3 Results of new failure data evaluation

Unfortunately, many datasets were not complete so that we had to exclude a lot of data. Since the last failure data evaluation [1], we added 76 new complete PVDSs to the PV system data collection. The data collection consists of 226 PVDSs in total. An overview of the distribution of the PV systems and the analysed PV module technologies is given in Figure 12. Most data is from Europe. In total, data from all 6 continents are available. Although the market share of



mono- and multi-crystalline silicon solar wafers has switched from the multi market domination to a mono market domination, the main analysed technologies are still multi-crystalline silicon wafer based solar cells. In the data collection, PV systems are include with installation year beginning from 1982 to 2018. Over 90% of the data are from PV systems installed in the range of 2005 to 2018.




Figure 12: Left - Distribution of PV system locations in the data collection. Right - Distribution of PV module technologies in the data collection.

Figure 12 shows the frequency distribution for PV module failures with an impact on the power generation of the PV systems. The distribution is split into failures which lead to a degradation and sudden occurring failures. Most reports on failures with power loss are given in the first 10 years of operating time. This is to be expected as it is often too expensive to repair PV systems older than 10 years. Therefore, no detailed analysis is made. The main results of the last report "Assessment of Photovoltaic Module Failures in the Field" remain true. PID effects, cell cracks and defective bypass diode failures seem to dominate the failure statistic in the first seven years. This dominance now becomes even more pronounced in comparison with the statistics presented in [1]. Additionally, the failure type "burn marks" have been detected more frequently. For sudden events, also shown in Figure 13, the failure glass breakage and dust soiling fully dominate the failure statistic.

Figure 14 shows the power loss impact of sudden events on PV system performance. Documented glass breakage events lead in temperate climates to a loss of 1% to 2% of a system's power, with one exception in the dataset. These events seem to occur everywhere but appear to be not so severe for the whole system. Dust soiling appears everywhere except for tropical climates. In temperate climates, the impact is at a maximum 7% of the total system power whereas up to 15% power loss occurs in dry climates and over 25% for continental climates. As expected, the deformed PV module frame due to snow load occurs only in the continental and polar climate.






Figure 13: Failure frequency for PV module defects with an impact on the system power. The upper graph is showing PV module failure frequency with a slow degradation over time and the lower graph failure frequency for sudden events.




Figure 14: Power loss of sudden failure events on the total power of the PV system.



Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the degradation rate for the affected system parts and the whole system for various failures sorted by climatic zones. The additional data supports the former statements for the degradation rates of the failure types in [1].




Figure 15: Box plot of degradation rates d_x of PV module affected by failures x sorted by climatic zones. The numbers show the quantity of data per failure in the database. The cross shows the mean degradation rate. The boxes include 50% of all values, the whisker show the full range of existing values. The middle line in the box shows the median.




Figure 16: Degradation rates of the whole PV system sorted by climatic zones. The numbers show the quantity of data per failure in the database. The boxplot and the whisker have the same meaning as in Figure 15.






Figure 17: Left - Failure frequency of PID-s. Right – Burn mark cases in the base data as function of the installation time of the system.

A common effect is that new and unexpected failures types occur in the field. After they are recognised, understood and tests are developed, the failure type vanishes in the field because the manufacture can develop their products defect free. The PID-s and burn mark effect, shown in Figure 17, are good example for such a cycle. The first PID-s reports are for PV systems installed in 2008. In 2016, after 8 years, we have no more reports on PID-s failures in the field in the data collection. The burn mark defects show a similar trend.

However, for new PV modules similar failure types may reappear in the field. A potential induced polarization (PID-p) effect is found for PERC solar modules with bifacial cell design (PERC+) [53]. However, this effect was found before large systems have been installed. Similarly, we have observed hot cell effects in PV modules with high power (>400 Wp) [54]. Perfectly blocked cells in high power modules, when locally shaded, may become as hot as about 180°C in the full unshaded cell area. However, this effect is found in an early stage to develop mitigation strategies before these modules were installed in the field.

There are some substantial types of PV module failures missing in the PVDS which have a major impact on power loss for PV systems if they appear. We could not manage to fit the available data into the data collection as always, some important data is missing, there are reports on acetic acid corrosion focussing on tropical climates [55] which led to power losses between 30% to 70% of the PV modules in 8 years of exposure. This defect type does not occur in the same time span with the same module type in moderate climates. Furthermore, there are reports on back sheet failure causing some isolation failures up to corrosion and power loss in the solar cell matrix of the modules [56], [57] up to a total loss of mechanical module integrity with a following disintegration of the modules.



3.3 PV Cost Data

Besides the power of the PV system, occurring costs are essential to make the best decisions from a cost-benefit perspective. O&M costs are costs required to operate and maintain PV plants. The scope of O&M works comprises of tasks such as IR scans of the plant as introduced in Chapter 2.4, and supports the identification of performance losses. Therefore, these costs are part of the quantitative risk assessment. For the most important measures the cost ranges were collected from [19] and are shown in Table 7.

PM Task	Costs	Remarks
Base O&M scope	6 - 14 €/kWp/year	Includes: full preventive maintenance scope, regular module cleanings, security (remote or on-site); excl. IR and EL scans. Varying highly with the site characteristics, labour and frequency of activity.
Cleaning/washing of PV modules	0.5 - 2.5 €/kWp/year	Varying with the module technology, labour, cleaning solution and method, climatic con- ditions (affecting the frequency), etc.
IR scans	0.5 – 3.0 €/module	Includes drone inspections, analysis and re- porting
EL scans	3.0 – 10.0 €/module	

Table 7: Collection	n of typical c	costs for in	ndividual C	XM services	[19].
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4 CASE STUDIES

Having the methods presented and data collected, the following chapter demonstrates risk and cost-benefit analysis using three case studies that show techniques for prioritising decisions from an economic perspective and provide important results for risk managing strategies.

4.1 Risk Analysis

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Risk analysis enables users with statistical and reliability data to develop and run scenarios in which PV performance and costs are affected by components that can fail.

4.1.1 Case 1: Inverter complete failure (not operating)

In this chapter the revised CPN approach, introduced in Chapter 2.3.1 is presented through an exemplary calculation of individual CPN values [4] [58].

The PV plant under consideration is in operation since 2013 and is located in central Italy. Table 8 summarizes the metadata of the system.

Parameter	
Type of plant	Ground-mounted fixed tilt
Installed capacity	9,019.531 kWp
Country	Italy
Commissioning data	25-08-2013
Feed in tariff	0.119 €/kWh
Number of modules	69,381
Module nominal power	130 Wp
Number of inverters	17
Inverter nominal power	500 kW

Table 8.	Metadata	of	investigated	ΡV	plant	in	Case 1	
Table 0.	Metadata		mvestigateu	I V	plant		Ouse I	=

Overall, 191 maintenance tickets were analysed manually, corresponding to all the planned and corrective activities carried out in 2018 for the example plant. Time-series of monitoring data are available since November 2016, including on-site irradiance (pyranometer measurements) and power (inverter measurements). A detailed metadata table was created containing all the relevant parameters useful for our purpose, mapping all the components of the plant whose failure could cause a power loss. This metadata table was populated using as source the available as-built documentation, the O&M contract and other CAPEX and OPEX related documents.

The improved CPN methodology has been applied manually to the introduced case study, which led to important improvements, especially in terms of the structure and standardisation of the CPN table (see Table 9). The analysis of real maintenance tickets has mainly led to the optimization of the number and format of the input parameters. Instead of using the methodology to create scenarios based on assumptions that would cover a wide spectrum of O&M approaches, real data from a specific O&M contractor were used. Parameters such as costs of interventions and spare parts, failure, acknowledgement, response and repair times were directly extracted from the monitoring and ticketing system. This task proved to be very time-consuming because, although the description of failure and corrective measures is common



practice in the field of O&M, it is not often carried out with the sufficient level of detail to derive meaningful statistical analyses due to the lack of a standardized approach in the assignment, wording and categorization of failures.

Ticket name	tdetection	tresponse	t _{repair}	EIOSSTOTAL	C _{fix}		Cdown		CPN
Ticket name	[h]	[h]	[h]	[kWh]	[€]	[€] [€/kWp]		[€/kWp]	[€/kWp]
Inverter 3D off	0.40	0.10	1.33	424	50.44	0.01	46.67	0.005	0.011
Meter 1 con- nect error	18.20	1.00	95.5	0	0.0	0.00	255.00	0.028	0.028
Inverter 1B off	2.60	126.15	502.83	27,956	3,326.7	0.37	1,066.00	0.118	0.487
Inverter 1B off	1.18	0.40	0.58	76	9.09	0.00	20.42	0.002	0.003
Inverters cabin 3 off	8.70	16.30	0.83	4,704	559.83	0.06	29.17	0.003	0.065
Inverter 1B off	1.58	1.00	8.17	2,326	276.73	0.03	285.83	0.032	0.062
Plant off	0.17	0.17	19.83	11,360	1,351.86	0.15	35.00	0.004	0.154

Table 9: Extract of the CPN table related to the Case 1.

The results presented in Table 9 are examples of how the CPN methodology can be used to accurately calculate the cost of individual entries in the ticketing system of a PV plant. The automation of calculating the CPN for a great number of tickets and plants will enhance our understanding of the appearance likeliness and severity of PV plant performance impairing issues in order to improve the operation of existing plants and the design of future PV systems. It is concluded that the development of an automated and therefore, time-efficient solution for extracting key parameters from maintenance tickets is of vital importance for the implementation of the methodology at portfolio level, and thus, to gain statistical insights from the large number of PV plants.

It became apparent that the O&M field practices must move away from the manual input of tickets in text format and adopt a more standardised approach where human intervention is limited to choosing the category and failure type from a pre-defined selection list.

4.1.2 Case 2: PV Module PID

How the risk quantification method can be also applied in practice is demonstrated using a 10 MW PV plant with PID affected PV modules. The assumptions in Table 10 serve as input for this case study. Not considered are financial parameter as depreciation, interest or taxes.

Parameter	
Risk	Potential induced degradation (PID)
Detection time	4 years
Response time	1 year
Repair time	1 year
Size of plant	10 MW
Module tilted/ orientation	20°, 0° south oriented, 2 portraits
Type of installation	Free Field Installation

 Table 10: Metadata of investigated PV plant in Case 2.



Base frame	Fixed Installation
Modules	40000 x 250 Wp
Inverters	20 x 500 kVA
PPA	0.25 €/kWh
CAPEX	20 Mio€
OPEX	50 k€/a
Inverter nominal power	500 kW

Taking the behaviour of the identified root cause into account, the potential future PLR is expected to increase further with an expected saturation of 50%. After this value is reached, the PLR is expected to stagnate at a constant level of 0.7% per year. This prediction of performance development for 20 years of operation is shown together with the exceedance probability P10 and P90 for a confidence level of 68.2% in Figure 18. Taking CAPEX, OPEX and annual revenues into account, the project's financial profit after 20 years of operation is 48% below original expectations for the defined scenario without mitigating actions.




Figure 18: Energy forecast of No-Mitigation Scenario.

4.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis

The CPN methodology allows the estimation of the economic impact of failures on the LCOE and on business models of PV projects and has been developed not only to determine the economic impact of technical risks, but also to be able to assess the effectiveness of mitigation measures. Specific failures have to be examined in order to draw recommendations on how to mitigate the economic impact for, e.g. soiling, or potential induced degradation (PID). Some failures can be prevented or mitigated through specific actions at different project phases (e.g. for PID); others (e.g. soiling) can be prevented or mitigated through a more generic action. For



example, the monitoring of performance or visual inspection can be considered as generic mitigation measures that can have a positive impact on the reduction of the CPN of many failures. In practice, it is important to understand how mitigation measures can be considered as a whole to be able to calculate their impact and thus assess their effectiveness.

4.2.1 Case 2: PV Module PID

The cost-benefit analysis is also a tool to determine whether the benefit of one option will justify its costs. It can point out the best mitigation options from an economical point of view. The analysis continues the case study presented in Chapter 4.1.2. Three mitigation scenarios are defined:

- **No-Mitigation** option without intervening into the current status of plant operation
- **PID Box**: Installing PID-boxes and allowing the performance of the PV modules to recover to a certain level
- **PID Box & partial repowering**: Installing PID-boxes and replacing very low performing PV modules by high-power-modules.

The expected annual production of energy yields for the three scenarios is illustrated in in Figure 19. After the mitigation measures were applied in year 5 of the operation, the energy yields show a steep rise. The expected PV plant output after 20 years of operation is calculated at 45% rated energy output for the no-mitigation scenario and at 84% and 91% for mitigation options 1 and 2, respectively.




Figure 19: 20-year forecast for three mitigation scenarios; the repowering is carried out with a higher module power class.



Table 11: Costs of mitigation scenarios.

	No-Mitigation	PID Box	PID Box & partial repowering
Cost [k€]	15	238	3233

The cost-benefit analysis also takes the associated costs of the available options into account, as described in Table 14. The impact on the annual cash flow is demonstrated in Figure 20. In the reference scenario, the monetary yield of the PV project after 20 years is expected to be around 225% of the CAPEX (dashed line). If no mitigation measures are taken, the lowest result of around 115% of CAPEX is forecasted. Mitigation options 1 and 2 result in 6.0%, respectively 4.6% below expectations, which both represent successful projects results. It can be concluded that both mitigation options should be considered and taken as a solution compared to non-action. However, the additional investments in year 5 of operation for option 2 are significantly higher by a factor of 8.




Figure 20: Annual cumulative cash flow of the mitigation scenarios with CPN and loss of revenue after 5 and 10 year of operation if no action is taken.

4.2.2 Case 3: PV Module Soiling

Cleaning routines for PV power systems in desert regions are a typical corrective measure to reduce energy yield losses due to soiling. The impact of different cleaning procedures on the soiling losses over one year are calculated and shown in Figure 21 for a 10 MWp PV plant near Abu Dhabi [59]. The soiling rate is 0.3%/day and only two significant precipitation events are recorded during one year. If no cleaning (natural cleaning) is performed, soiling losses (brown bars) may reach up to 30% per year and result in annual costs of 2614 k\$ (Table 12).




Index	Soiling Loss	Precipitation Events	Cleaning Events
	[%]	[-]	[-]
Natural Cleaning	28.4	2	0
Periodic Cleaning	4.1	2	12
Triggered Cleaning	2.3	2	20

Table 12: Impact of cleaning routines on soiling losses of a 10 MWp plant in Abu Dhabi.

In case of periodic cleaning (monthly cleaning), energy losses due to soiling are reduced to 4% (green bars) resulting in reduced yield losses (377 k\$) and an annual cost of 497 k\$, which includes the costs of the 12 cleaning routines (Table 12). Best economic cleaning measure is achieved when performing "triggered cleaning" at a soiling loss of 5%, which results in further reduced yield losses (212 k\$) and an annual cost of only 412 k\$, which includes the costs of 20 required cleaning routines (Table 12). The calculations show that it is possible to determine the best economic solution for a specific PV plant (10 MWp), location (Abu Dhabi), loss scenario (0.3%/day soiling loss rate) and mitigation concept (three types of cleaning).

Table 13: Impact of cleaning routines on monetarized yield losses of a 10 MWp plant in	
Abu Dhabi.	

Index	Yield Loss	Cleaning Cost	Total Cost
	[k\$]	[k\$]	[k\$]
Natural Cleaning	2614	0	2614
Periodic Cleaning	377	120	497
Triggered Cleaning	212	200	412







5 CONCLUSIONS

Best practice guidelines to improve the operation of PV power systems are often only applied as long as recommended actions have advantages for the executors, the EPCs and O&M companies and for the investors whose main focus is on low risks and maximum profit from an economic point of view. This leads to the key challenge: How can you demonstrate the effectiveness of the measures and justify their application? The technical best solution is not always the economically best one. Before you are able to evaluate the cost-benefit, the following question arises: How to quantify the basic impact of technical risks?

In order to answer these questions, we introduced semi-quantitative and quantitative methodologies to assess technical risks in PV power systems and provided 30 examples of common technical risks described and rated in the new created PV failure fact sheets (PVFS). Besides the PVFSs based on expert knowledge and expert opinion, an update on the statistics of the PV failure degradation survey developed in Koentges et al. [1], was given. With the knowledge acquired and data collected, the risk and cost-benefit analysis were demonstrated in three case studies that showed methods for prioritising decisions from an economic perspective and provided important results for risk managing strategies.

However, providing the overview of quantification methods, we draw the conclusion that more standardisation is required. Risk definitions are not fully structured and event databases (solar logbooks) are not harmonised. Data analysis would benefit from the use of a standardised language and metadata formats. Development of an automated and therefore time-efficient solution for extracting key parameters from maintenance tickets is required to gain statistical insights from a large number of PV plants. Also, the development of a software tool for field technicians is recommended that would allow the precise and error-free recording of standard-ised parameters for the calculation of the O&M contractors KPIs necessary for an efficient implementation of the methodology [4]. In summary, the O&M field practices must certainly move away from a manual input of tickets in text format and adopt a more standardised approach where human intervention is limited.

In the 2020 launched H2020 project TRUST-PV [60], the improved Cost Priority Number approach is the basis for the creation of a large database including PV system data, coming from several major O&M companies and asset managers across Europe, for failure rates calculation. It is thereby a direct continuation where the improved Cost Priority Number methodology will be automatised in terms of acquiring failure data, power loss calculations and related cost determination. The output will later be integrated in the PV plant design of newly commissioned PV plants and in a decision support system platform for operating plants.

Technical risks from a reliability perspective, as introduced in the RAM analysis, are addressed in IEC TS 63265 – "*Reliability practices for the operation of photovoltaic power systems*", coordinated by Roger Hill with the planned publication in the first half of 2022. Its motivation is to provide a toolkit description of many methods of how different stakeholders can demonstrate the effective of reliability increasing measures from technical and economic point of view.

All things considered, we believe that data-driven evaluation of techno-economic performance indicators is a significant key to take decision support on LCOE to the next level.



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


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ANNEX 1

Component	Module					PVFS 1-1 vs.01		
Defect	Cell cracks					VIG 1-1VS.01		
Appearance	cannot be seen by the nake the cracks can be seen. Ce electroluminescence, UV flu lengths and orientations (cra eye when they form snail tra the cracks. A snail track is a cells which occurs typically metal fingers on cells may be on cell edges. Photobleachin	cracks in the silicon substrate of the photovoltaic cells. Most of the cell cracks by the naked eye. Only large cracks or where the backsheet is visible through be seen. Cell cracks can be easily detected through imaging techniques like ence, UV fluorescence or lock-in thermography. Cell cracks can have different entations (crack patterns). Small cell cracks (micro-cracks) become visible by orm snail tracks or when photobleaching or delamination takes place along hail track is a discoloration of the silver paste of the front metallisation of solar urs typically 3 months to 1 year after installation of the PV modules. Affected cells may be silver, yellow or brown in appearance, this effect can also be seen hotobleaching is a counteracting effect to the yellowing of the encapsulant and the cracks and the borders of the cells. Delamination along cracks is visible as						
Detection	EL, UV (IRT, VI ,IV)							
Origin	Cell cracks can have origin in all lifetime phases of a PV module: production, installation and operation. In production, cell cracks can occur during wafer, cell and module manufacturing. Especially the stringing and soldering process of the solar cells can damage the cells. After production, major sources for cell cracks are the packaging and transport of the modules, and the installation. After installation, external forces like hail, heavy snow weight or strong wind may result in cell cracks. Once cell cracks are present, further mechanical and thermomechanical stresses can lead to the propagation of the cracks into longer and wider cracks. Some crack patterns can give indications on the origin of the failure, but the final cause of cell breakage is not always easy to identify. A repetitive crack pattern can be for example caused by a production failure, whereas PV modules showing dendritic crack patterns have been probably exposed to heavy mechanical loads. Snail tracks can be found in a great variety of solar modules, but not in all. The combination of different materials (encapsulant and back sheets) with UV radiation and temperature plays an important role in the creation of snail tracks.							
	Production	Installatio	on 📃	Operat	ion			
Impact	Cell cracking does not necessarily lead to a failure of the module. The presence of a crack of any size that does not, or likely will not through its propagation, remove more than 10% of that cell's area from the electrical circuit can be considered to have limited to no impact on the performance. Even if each cell in a 60 cell module is cracked, but do not lead to a separated ce area, the power loss of the module is typically below 2.5 % of the nominal power. In cold and snow climate zones cell cracks seem to have a more pronounced impact. Here relatively high mean degradation rates of up to 7%/y can be found. Besides the risk of power loss there is a risk of hot spots and burn marks due to inactive cell parts. Snail tracks are reported to have no influence on the performance of the PV module, but due to the observed porous silver fingers the isolation of cracked cell parts may be accelerated more than it would be without snail tracks							
	Safety:		Performance:	1234	5			
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventiv (recommo	ve actions ended)		Preventive actions (optional)			
	Modules with a direct safe risk or a severity of 5 shoul be replaced. Regular inspec- tions should be done to mor tor the status of the not re- placed modules.	d dures, in: - ing by t i- case of	Adequate transport proce- dures, installation and clean- ing by trained personal, in case of higher snow or hail risk use of therefore certified modules.		n, pre insp obile insta tion	pictures from pro- e-shipment or ware- ection, EL images laboratory before or allation, regular EL or after sever nditions.		



EXAMPLES	6 (page2)					PV	FS 1-1 vs.01
Examples 10-12							
	Zoom of snail track with del nation. [41]	ami-	Zoom of snail tra fingers. [37]	ack with browne	ed Zoom of tion. [SL		ack with delamina-
Severity		Η		⊢234	- (f	•	⊢234⊣
Examples 13-15	Cell crack with EVA delam						a pattern due to im- dering machine.
	tion. [TUV Rheinland] (see PVFS 1-3)	aiso	caused by hail.	TUV Rheiniand	d] pact o [SUPSI]		dening machine.
Severity		-	fe	H 2 3 4			+21
Examples 16	Typical EL picture of cell cra mechanical load (X-crack pa						
Severity	f e		<u>⊢</u> + <u>3</u> 4 <u></u> +1				

Component Defect	Module Discolouration of encapsu	llant or backsheet	PVFS 1-2 vs.01			
Appearance	The degradation of the encapsulation or backsheet materials is getting visible as a light yellow to dark brown discolouration. Colour can be next to or above the cells, along the busbars or cell interconnects or on the back or front side of the backsheet. Often discolouration is inhomogeneous and follows spatial patterns depending on the type of module construction. Typically, for glass/backsheet modules the browning occurs in the central region of the cells with wide clear encapsulant areas, or "frames" around the cell edges. Discolouration can also be observed in the encapsulant between neighbouring solar cells when the front side of the backsheet (layer behind the cells) is degrading. For glass/glass module constructions the encapsulant discolouration is mostly spatially uniform, but can also show patterns of clearer areas over some cells. In glass/backsheet modules the location of these patterns generally correlates with cell cracks . In some cases, the discolouration is more pronounced in one or more cells of the module.					
Detection	VI, (IV, IRT)					
Origin	In the past, yellowing or browning was mostly associated with the degradation of the mostly used encapsulant ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA) but this problem was greatly solved by improved stabilisation of the polymer with additives, including UV absorbers and thermal stabilizers. If the choice of additives and/or their concentrations are inadequate, or the lamination process is inadequate or incomplete, the encapsulation material may discolour over time. The patterns of discolouration observed in the field can be very complex because of the diffusion of oxygen or the products of reaction, such as acetic acid, generated when heat and UV light interact with EVA. The presence of oxygen leads to the so called photobleaching effect which creates a ring of transparent EVA around the perimeter of a cell or a cell crack. The case of single cells which are far darker than the adjacent cells, implies that the most discoloured cell was at higher temperature than the surrounding cells, perhaps because of differences between the cells or the cell being located above the junction box.					
	Production	Installation	Operation			
Impact	Discoloration is a sign that the polymeric compounds within the module started to degrade This type of degradation is predominantly considered to be first an aesthetic issue before a decrease of module current and power production is detected. Typically, mean yearly degrad dation rates due to yellowing are about 0.5%/a and may reach up to 1%/a in hot and humid of moderate climates. While it is uncommon for EVA discolouration to induce other failures within the cell, it may correlate to: high temperatures in the field, the generation of acetic acid and concomitant corrosion and embrittlement . Unless discolouration is very severe and localized at a single cell, where it could cause a substring bypass-diode to turn on, the discolouration of EVA does not present any direct safety issues. More critical is the discolouration of UV sensi tive backsheets that can result in a loss of mechanical properties (elastic behaviour) and cracking of backsheet due to thermomechanical stresses.					
	Safety:	Performance:	2 3			
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recommended)	Preventive actions (optional)			
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced. Regular inspec- tions should be done to moni- tor the status of the not re- placed modules.	Check validity of IEC 61215 certification and BOM.	Regular system inspections For areas with harsh climate, request modules pass higher test standards, like double or triple IEC 61215 test condi- tion.			

EXAMPLES	S (page1)				PVF	S 1-2 vs.01
Examples 1-3						
		d EVA in the cen- h photobleaching 6]		d EVA in the cen- h photobleaching 4]	Yellowed backs side. [37]	sheet from the in-
Severity		⊢ <mark>2</mark>		-231		1 2
Examples 4-6						
		tion at cell edges, nd over gridlines 7]	Dark discoloura zation. [37]	tion over metali-	Backsheet air [37]	side yellowing.
Severity		H 2 3 1		H 2 3	e	1 2
Examples 7		rned much faster due to local heat-				
	ing. [16]					
Severity						

Component Defect	Module Front de	elamination				P	VFS 1-3vs.01	
Appearance	cell and t ous or in	Any local separation of the layers between (i) the front glass and the encapsulant or (ii) the cell and the encapsulant, visible as bubbles or as bright, milky area/s. It may appear continuous or in spots. The position and size of the delamination or bubble depends on the origin and progress of the failure.						
Detection	VI, (INS)							
Origin	mised for linking of improper of the ra stresses,	The adhesion between the glass, encapsulant, active layers, and back layers can be compro- mised for many reasons. Typically, it is caused by the manufacturing process (e.g. poor cross inking of EVA, too short lamination times, too high pressure in the laminator, contaminations, mproper cleaning of the glass, incompatibility of EVA with soldering flux, inadequate storage of the raw material) or environmental factors (e.g. thermal stresses, external mechanical stresses, UV). Delamination is generally followed by moisture ingress and corrosion . It is therefore more frequent and severe under hot and humid conditions.						
	Productio	on 📃	Installatio	n 🗌	(Operation		
	Delamination or bubbles do not automatically pose a safety issue, but they can result in re- duced insulation of the component and increased safety risk when they form a continuous path between electric circuit and the edge due to possible water ingress. Moisture in the mod- ule will decrease performance due to an increase of series resistance, affect long term relia- bility and in some cases also the structural integrity of the module. Moreover, delamination at interfaces in the optical path will result in additional optical reflection and subsequent decrease in current. This can be the origin of current mismatch. If the mismatch is significant, it will trigger the bypass diode and cause further power loss. The inverter might also shut down due to leakage current's leading to a further performance loss. Manufacturing related delamination issues often affects a relevant percentage of modules within the same production batch and consequentially has a big impact on system performance.					loisture in the mod- ect long term relia- ver, delamination at bsequent decrease s significant, it will also shut down due elated delamination		
	Safety:			Performance:	1 2	3 4 5	5	
Mitigation	Correctiv	e actions	Preventive actions (recommended)			Preventive (optional)	actions	
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced. Regular inspec- tions should be done to moni- tor the status of the not re- placed modules. In case of in- dividual module testing all modules which failed the insu- lation and/or wet-leakage test should be replaced.		Check validity of IEC 61215 certification and BOM, ground fault detection by inverter or other devices at all time.		ound l er or t	heat), pre- tions (e.g.	testing (e.g. damp -shipment inspec- cross linking level gular visual system s.	

EXAMPLES	(page1)				PVF	-S 1-3 vs.01
Examples 1-3	Encapsulant de critical position	elamination in un- [SUPSI]	-	elamination from		elamination from
Severity		1		1 2		1 2
Examples 4-6						
		elamination from due to glass tex- bus bars. [37]		elamination along] (see also PVFS		elamination near abination with cell
Severity		1 2	f e			-23
Examples 7-9		front of cell in the module. [40] (see	connections o	at module insert f a glass/glass n box). [SUPSI]	Delamination at	cell edges. [16]
Severity		⊢234⊣	<u>e</u>	12	e	

EXAMPLES	(page2)				PVI	-S 1-3 vs.01
Examples 10-12						
	Encapsulant de ders. [37]	elamination at bor-		elamination along cell close to the 40]	glass (spotted o	amination of from due to glass tex- e of the cell. [37]
Severity	•	1	e	1 2 +++	e	-231
Examples 13-15						
		reating a continu- een electric circuit [40]		vith corrosion. [1] 11)	ment of backshe	aused by detach- eet with exposure from the back.
Severity	e	⊢ <u></u> 3 4 5	e e	<u>⊢</u>	•	<u>⊢ 1 3 4 5</u>

Component Defect		et delamination				F	PVFS 1-4 vs.01	
Appearance	backsheet tion). The worst case	Any local separation of the polymeric back sheet layers leading to an air gap between the backsheet and the rest of the module, or within the multilayer backsheet (=internal delamina- tion). The backsheet may appear wavy, with locally limited bumps, bubbles or ripples. In the worst case, one or more layers may peel off. The position and extent of the delamination will depend on the cause and progression of the failure.						
Detection	VI, (INS)							
Origin	market. Wi layer) inter degradatic one or mo the backsh from a lack the delami from differ (material in UV and mo frequent a	There are many different forms and compositions of polymeric multilayer backsheets on the market. With laminated backsheets (polymeric layers adhered to each other by a thin adhesive layer) internal delamination can appear: the multiple layers may delaminate upon adhesive degradation, which may lead to local delamination of two subsequent layers or a peel-off of one or more layers. Co-extruded backsheet are prone to internal lamination. Delamination of the backsheet from the encapsulant can appear with all types of backsheets and originates from a lack of adhesion between the backsheet are (i) thermo-mechanical stress originating from differing CTE of the individual polymeric layers, (ii) chemical reactions at the interfaces (material incompatibility) or deteriorated interfacial bonding as a result of the attack from heat, UV and moisture or (iii) external mechanical stress applied on the module. Therefore, it is more frequent and severe under hot and humid conditions. Delamination can be also caused by an insufficient lamination process e.g. too short lamination times.						
	Production	ו 🗌	Installatio	n 🗌	(Operation		
Impact	an immedi the heat co is not furth minimal. H edge of a r provide a co to the press serious sa putting me cause a co	iate safety issue. The onduction/dissipation her mechanically cra- dowever, if delamina module there would be direct pathway for liques sence of dew. That can fety concern. Similal echanical stress on connection failure to a	at area wo in through the icked or ex- ition of the be more se uid water to an provide rly, delami live compo a bypass d	uld likely operat the backsheet is of panded, the pe backsheet occu- rious safety cond o enter the modu a direct electrica nation near a ju- nents with the o iode and possibl	e at sli disturb rforma urs nea cerns. l le durin al pathy nction danger ly resu	ightly high bed. But as ince and s ar a juncti Delamina ng a rains way to gro box can o r of break ilt in an ur	ck, it will not present her temperatures as s long as the bubble safety concerns are ion box, or near the tion at the edge may torm, or in response bund creating a very cause its loosening, tage. A break might hmitigated arc at full ich layer is affected.	
	Safety:			Performance:	1 2	34		
Mitigation	Corrective	actions	Preventiv (recomme			Preventive (optional)	e actions	
	risk or a s be replace tions shou tor the sta placed mo dividual r modules w	with a direct safety everity of 5 should ed. Regular inspec- ld be done to moni- atus of the not re- dules. In case of in- nodule testing all which failed the insu- for wet-leakage test replaced.	certification	lidity of IEC 61 on and BOM. ault detection by other devices a	y in-	Regular s	ystem inspections.	

EXAMPLES	(page1)				PV	FS 1-4 vs.01
Examples 1-3						
	Multiple bubbles and edge of the	s in the centre backsheet. [46]	Blisters because rier, such as alu	e of vapour bar- minium foil. [1]	Big central bul ination. [16]	bble + wavy delam-
Severity	e	H 2 3 4 H	e e	1234 +	e	1
Examples 4-5						
		nination with di- of encapsulant.		top layer without encapsulant.		
Severity	f e	H 2 3 4 H		1 2 3		

Component Defect	Module Backsheet c	racking				PVFS 1-5	Ö vs.01
Appearance	Any damage of the backsheet (surface or whole stack) that is visible as crack, burst or scratch. The location and extent of the cracks depend on the cause and progression of the failure. The cracked area may be localized (e.g bursted bubble, scratch), extend along specific module areas (e.g. long or between the cells, along the busbars) or extend over large or the full area of the module (e.g embrittled surface). The crack can be very deep and affect the back sheet stack.						
Detection	VI, (INS)						
Origin	thermal stress, with the multim lation (local cu followed by mo humid condition material combi failures. Disco Deep cracks o	The degradation of the backsheet can be caused by environmental factors like UV-irradiation, hermal stress, external mechanical stress or by internal stress (e.g. thermomechanical stress with the multimaterial composite PV-module) or incorrect handling during transport and instal- ation (local cuts, scratches). Deep backsheet cracking (whole backsheet stack split) is often ollowed by moisture ingress and corrosion . This is more frequent and severe under hot and numid conditions. The use of low quality material (e.g. low UV resistance) or incompatible material combinations (backsheet ↔ encapsulant) causes most of the premature degradation ailures. Discolouration and or strong chalking can be precursors for backsheet cracking. Deep cracks or bursted bubbles can be the result of local hotspots/burn marks that split or break the backsheet.					
	Production]	Installatio	n 📃	Op	eration	
Impact	potential groun into the module case of deep of	d fault. On the lo e which induces	ong-term, p further fail the active	ower degradation ures (e.g. corrost part of the cells	on due to sion, dela	ing a safety hazard the penetration of n mination) can occu lation is immediate	noisture r. In the
	Safety:	e me		Performance:	1 2 3	4 5	
Mitigation	Corrective acti	ons	Preventiv (recomm			eventive actions otional)	
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced. Regular inspec- tions should be done to moni- tor the status of the not re- placed modules. In case of in- dividual module testing all modules which failed the insu- lation and/or wet-leakage test should be replaced.Ground fault detection by in- verter or other devices at all time, check validity of IEC 61215 certification and BOM, visual inspection before in- stallation.Regular system insImage: Regular inspection tor the status of the not re- placed modules. In case of in- dividual module testing all modules which failed the insu- lation and/or wet-leakage test should be replaced.Image: Regular system ins				gular system inspec	ctions.	

EXAMPLES	6 (page1)		PVFS 1-5 vs.01
Examples 1-3	HH.		
	Cracked backsheet in combina- tion with yellowing under a hot cell. [39]	Squared cracks beneath cell in- terspaces. [39]	Cracking between cells. [38]
Severity	f m e - 2 3 4 5	f m e - 2 3 4 5	f m e + 2 3 4 5
Examples 4-6	Longitudinal cracks located under		
	bus bars. [39]	Backsheet cracking. [57]	Backsheet cracking. [57]
Severity Examples 7-8	f m e ⊢2 3 4 5	f m e + 2 3 4 5	f m e + 2 3 4 5
Severity		f m e 12	

Component	Module	Module DV/EC 4 C or					
Defect	Backshe	eet chalking (white	ening)			P	/FS 1-6 vs.01
Appearance	a finger c	White powder is detectable on the external surface of the backsheet. It can be seen by passing a finger over the backsheet. It can be removed. The backsheet has usually a rough or dull appearance.					
Detection	VI						
Origin	layer con	chalking is caused by the photothermal degradation of the polymers in the outer backsheet ayer containing inorganic pigments. For example, TiO ₂ pigments are often used in the outer ayers as UV blocker.					
	Productio	n 📃	Installatio	n 🗌	Ор	eration	
Impact	an ongoir to the deg sheet cra capsulant	does not affect moduling degradation of the gradation-induced rec acking and insulation f/active PV-parts can so on the performanc	backsheet duction of l n failures lead to co	and a precursor JV protection, m can occur. Enha	for sever lore seric anced mo	e backsh ous failure oisture dif	neet cracking. Due es, such as back- fusion into the en-
	Safety:	•		Performance:	1		
Mitigation	Corrective	e actions	Preventive actions (recommended) Preventive actions (optional)			actions	
	be done gress of t Ground fa	inspections should to monitor the pro- the observed failure. ault detection by in- other devices at all	- certification and BOM.				

EXAMPLES	S (page1)		PVFS 1-6 vs.01
Examples 1-2			
	Finger with white powder. [TUV Rheinland]	Fingerprint on a module with chalking. [TUV Rheinland]	
Severity		•••	

Component Defect	Module Burn marks			PVFS 1-7 vs.01				
Appearance	lead to bubbling or melting of the backsheet. Burn marks of inspection with an IR camera	Burn marks are visible with the naked eye as burnt, blackened area/s. The burn mark may lead to bubbling or melting of the polymeric encapsulant, and/or glass breakage or a hole in the backsheet. Burn marks on the backheet may be not visible from the front requiring an inspection with an IR camera if the back of the module is not accessible. They may however not be visible by IR inspection in case no further or ongoing heating occurs.						
Detection	VI, IRT, (EL)							
Origin	errors (e.g weak solder bonds rors, metal particles) and/or back-sheet) in combination w cuited bypass diodes , revers tion, heavy snow loads, a ligh shading during long-term PV s tion parts to break. Burn marks	The defect is associated with parts of the module that became very hot because of production errors (e.g weak solder bonds, ribbon breakage, incomplete cell edge isolation, alignment errors, metal particles) and/or transportation/handling errors (e.g, cracked cells, damaged pack-sheet) in combination with one or more operational factors (e.g. shadowing, open cir- suited bypass diodes, reverse current flows). Physical stress during PV module transportation, heavy snow loads, a lightning strike, thermal cycling, and/or hot spots by partial cell hading during long-term PV system operation forces mechanical weak(ended) cell/connecton parts to break. Burn marks occur for example when a reverse current flow causes heating hat further localizes the current flow, leading to a thermal runaway effect and the associated burn mark						
	Production	Installation	Opera	ition				
Impact	Burn marks on interconnections are often associated with power loss, but if redundant electri- cal interconnections are provided, a failed solder bond may have negligible effect on the power output. If all solder bonds for one cell break, then the current flow in that string is completely blocked and an electric arc can result if the current cannot be bypassed by the bypass diode and the system operates at high voltage. Performance, reliability and safety are likely to be severely compromised. Such an arc can cause a fire if there happen to be flammable material around. If there is a question about whether the existence of the burn mark requires replace- ment of the module, an infrared image under illuminated and/or partially shaded conditions will quickly identify whether the area is continuing to be hot and/or whether current flow has stopped in that part of the circuit. Temperature difference between neighbouring cells should not be over 30 K. At this stage safety risk may still be not so high because the temperature of this hot spot cell does not increase to more than around 100 °C. Also edge isolation faults on the solar cell level are under normal conditions not problematic, but when the bypass diode is in open-circuit, the current is driven in reverse through the shunts of the solar cells and burns the encapsulation.							
	Safety:	Performance:	1234	5				
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recommended)	Preve (option	ntive actions nal)				
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced. Regular inspec- tions should be done to moni- tor the status of the not re- placed modules.Visual inspection before in- stallation, commissioning of system with IRT.Regular system inspection system inspection							

EXAMPLES	S (page1)		PVFS 1-7 vs.01
Examples 1-3		-	
	Burn mark at the backsheet with cracked backsheet. [37]	Burn marks at the backsheet due to heating along a busbar. [16]	Burn mark associated with over- heating along the metallic inter- connection (without backsheet damage). [16]
Severity	f e m5	f e m + 3 4 5	f e m +23
Examples 4-6			
		narks caused by open-circuited by- ch conditions (due to shading or	Burn marks caused by defect bypass diodes or an intercon- nect failure in the junc. box. [16]
Severity	f e m	⊢3 4 5	f e m 3 4 5
Examples 7-9			
	Burn mark with broken glass caused by poor bussing ribbon soldering. [41] (s. also PVFS 1-8 and PVFS 1-8)	Burn mark due to intrinsic shunt- ing caused by error in manufac- turing process. [41]	Burn mark due to intrinsic shunting caused by error in manufacturing process. [41]
Severity		f e m 123	

Component Defect	Module Glass b	reakage				P	VFS 1-8vs.01
Appearance	dependir treated f	cracked locally or ov ng on the type of glass loat glass will shatte leat-treated glass sta	s and the or r into sma	rigin of the glass Il pieces, where	break	age. Tempe	ered glass or heat-
Detection	VI, IRT						
Origin	other ext mounting breaks al the modu modules The origin poor clan or (c) the ance with be exces glass of transporta	Glass breakages of the front glass can be caused by heavy impacts such as hail or stones or other extreme mechanical stress onto the module frame due to external stresses or bad mounting. High temperatures (hot-spot or arc) can also break the glass. Annealed glass breaks also due thermal gradients or stress induced by the lamination process or cleaning of the modules. A relatively often seen failure in the field is glass breakage of frameless PV modules caused by the clamps. Glass/glass modules are more sensitive to glass breakage. The origin of the failure is, on the one hand, at the planning and installation stage either (a) poor clamp geometry for the module, e.g. sharp edges, (b) too short and too narrow clamps or (c) the positions, kind or number of the clamps on the module not being chosen in accordance with the manufacturer's manual. The second origin which induces glass breakage could be excessively-tightened screws during the mounting phase or badly-positioned clamps. The glass of some PV modules may also break due to vibrations and shocks occurring during transportation or handling. Another reason for glass breakage comes from impact stresses on the glass edge. Sometimes vandalism or animal damage happens, the animals like goats like					
	Productic	n	Installatio	n 🔲	(Operation	
Impact	age leads penetration usually all spots. Me ules is no hot spots	nechanical integrity is s to loss of performa on of oxygen and wa so breaks the cells re echanical and electric longer guaranteed, in , which lead to overhe urrent and power redu	ince due to ater vapour educing the al safety is n particular eating of th	o cell and electr into the PV mo power of the m thus compromis in wet condition e module. A mo	ical cir odule. S nodule ed. Firs s. Seco	cuit corrosi Shattering c and increas stly, the insu ondly, glass	on caused by the of tempered glass sing the risk of hot ulation of the mod- breakage causes
	Safety:	f e m f	e m	Performance:	1 2	3 4 5	
Mitigation	Correctiv	e actions	Preventive (recomme			Preventive a optional)	actions
	All dama to be rep	iged modules have laced.	dures, ins ing by ti case of h	transport pr stallation and clorained personal nigher snow or e of certified n	ean- I, in hail	Regular sys	tem inspections.

EXAMPLES	6 (page1)		PVFS 1-8 vs.01
Examples 1-3			
	Chipped glass at the corner. [38]	Glass breakage along the string interconnect ribbons due to weak manufacturing process. [SUPSI]	Glass breakage of tempered glass induced by a hot-spot. [SUPSI]
Severity	— — — — — —		f e m 3 4 5
Examples 4-6			
	Glass breakage caused by too tight screws. [16] (see also PVFS 3-1)		Glass breakage caused due to poor clamp design. [1] (see also PVFS 3-1)
Severity			
Examples 7-9	Glass breakage through high temperature gradient and not tempered glass. [16]		Breakage of tempered glass. [1]
Severity		f e m + 3 4 5	f e m 3 4 5

EXAMPLES	6 (page2)		PVFS 1-8 vs.01
Examples 10-12			
	Direct lightning stroke. [46]	Impact damage caused by a Hail da heavy object. [SUPSI]	mage. [SUPSI]
Severity			• m + 5

Component Defect	Module Cell interconnection failur	PVFS 1-9 vs.01			
Appearance	Weak or broken cell or string interconnection are not easy to see by the naked eye. The failure can be identified as dark region in the electroluminescence image where the failed interconnect would otherwise be collecting carriers or as a hot spot in the infrared image. In a progressed stage burn marks and glass breakage can occur.				
Detection	EL, IRT, STM, (VI)				
Origin	Typically, it is caused by the manufacturing process (e.g. poor soldering, misplacement of ribbons, too intense deformation of the ribbon kink, narrow distance between the cells) followed by thermomechanical stress or repetitive wind load caused by the outdoor operating environment. Electrochemical corrosion can be another cause for the degradation of interconnections.				
	Production	Installation	Operation		
Impact	Poor interconnections (soldering bonds) lead to an increase of contact resistance, higher power dissipation and localized heating. Broken connections are often associated with power loss, but if redundant electrical interconnections are available, a failed connection may have negligible effect on the power output. Safety risk may be not so high until the temperature of the induced hot spot does not increase to more than around 100 °C. If all busbars of a cell are interrupted, then the current flow in that string is completely blocked and an electric arc can result if the current is not bypassed by the bypass diode and the system operates at high voltage. The safety risk depends on the durability of this bypass diode. A bypass diode, which is continuously active over days can be damaged and pass into open-circuit or short circuit state. As a result of an open circuited diode , the current goes through the failed cell string and generates heat at the disconnected position. Very high temperatures or an electric arc and may cause fire, open electrical conducting parts to the user and destroy the mechanical integrity of the module.				
	Safety:	Performance: 1	2 3 4 5		
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recom- mended)	Preventive actions (op- tional)		
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced. Regular inspec- tions should be done to moni- tor the status of the not re- placed modules.	Check validity of IEC 61215 certification and BOM.	Regular system inspections.		

EXAMPLES	6 (page1)				PVI	FS 1-9vs.01
Examples 1-3			X X Disconnecte detected			
	Zoom of a brok nect. [41]	en cell intercon-	-	odule with 3 cells ted interconnect	Disconnected with delamination	cell interconnect on. [1]
Severity	f e	-234-1	f e	-234-1	f e	⊢234⊣
Examples 4-6						
	Dislocation of ribbon. [37]	interconnection	connect leading	of string inter- to burn mark and [41] (see also VFS 1-8)	ductive glue or	n occur if the con- n the string inter- n insufficient con-
Severity		1 2	f e m		fe	

Component Defect	Module Potential induced degradation (PID) (page1)				PVFS 1-10vs.01	
Appearance						
Detection	IV, EL, IF	RT, (MON)				
Origin	PID is a degradation mode induced by a high voltage stress with respect to ground. The occurrence of this failure depends on the magnitude of the voltage (number of serially connected PV modules per string) and the polarity of the electrical field build-up between the framing/glass surface and the solar cells. The last depends on the inverter typology (transformer), the grounding concept and cell technology. Modules with p-type cells degrade in negative polarity strings whereas modules with n-type cells in strings with positive polarity. PID degradation is more pronounced the higher the potential to which a single cell within a module or string is subjected. The PID effect is therefore stronger in cells that are located at the edges of the module (close to frame) and to the bottom of a string with an increase towards one end of the string. The degradation is further accelerated by temperature, humidity, rain (surface wetting), condensation and soiling. Two different types of PID are known for crystalline silicon modules: PID-p (p olarization) and PID-s (s hunting). The PID-p was observed for the first time in back contact cells within Sunpower modules. PID-p is caused by the build-up of negative surface charges on the cells, which results in a current loss. The PID-s is induced by leakage currents through the module's front glass and the encapsulation material. The flow of Na+ ions mainly from the glass into the cell leads to the creations of shunts. For both PID types, module and cell design has a fundamental influence if and how much a module is affected by PID. There are modules on the market which are designed to be PID resistant.					
	Productio	on 📃	Installatio	n 📃	Opera	ation
Impact	Yield losses of 20 percent and more within 1 year were observed in the past. The PID-s effect causes a reduction of I-V curve fill factor and output power. Short circuit is affected only in very progressed state. Due to its catastrophic performance loss PID-s bears a high economi risk. PID-s is to some extent a reversible polarization effect and can therefore 'repaired' of omitted when detected in time. If detected too late the PV system can't be repaired and non reversible damages has to be taken into account. The PID-p effect causes instead a signif cant reduction of short circuit current, open circuit voltage and power. PID-p can be fully re generated by reversing the polarity of the bias potential. Up to now safety problems directl related to the PID are not reported, but hot spots and corrosion caused by the strong ce mismatch may cause later safety issues. The PID sensitivity of PV modules can be tested in the laboratory. Anti-PID insurance can be obtained, although many insurers need to be edu cated about the phenomenon for correct risk estimation and pricing.					
	Safety:			Performance:	⊢234	5

Component Defect	Module Potential induced degrada	PVFS 1-10vs.01	
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recommended)	Preventive actions (optional)
	How to proceed depends very much on the stage on which PID is detected. If detected in an early stage recovery is possible by applying a reverse voltage during night-time. Specific anti PID kits are avail- able on the market promising a recovery of the lost power. As there is not a full guarantee that the recovery will be effec- tive for the specific situation, it should be monitored or meas- ured to see if the problem has been sufficiently solved. In the case of progressed PID with- out visible module damages, the recovery could need sev- eral months or even years suggesting in any case a re- placement of all modules with modules tested to be PID re- sistant.	Modules tested for PID ac- cord. IEC 62804-1 should be less prone to PID (verify that BOM corresponds!)	PID prevention at system level: The installation of an in- verter with transformer can be considered as mitigation measure for the PID phenom- enon. On the other hand, the trade-off with the inverter effi- ciency and the cost of the in- verter must be taken into ac- count. Anti-PID insurance.

EXAMPLES	S (page1)		PV	/FS 1-10vs.01	
Examples 1-2		C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C			
	Strings with PID, detected v	vith IR thermography. [16]	Dark IR thermograph affected by PID. [16]	hy at I_{sc} for a module	
Severity		⊢ <mark>2345</mark>		⊢2345	
Examples 3-4	PV-	PV+			
	Strings with PID, detected v	vith EL imaging.	Electroluminescence image made at I_{sc} for a module affected by PID. [16]		
Severity	•	⊢ <mark>2345</mark>		⊢2345	
Examples 5-6	PID affected module with pa	Voltage [V]		a with power loss of	
		ower loss of 89%, left: EL at 1.5 same module at 1000 and 200	PID affected module with power loss of 14%. top: EL at $1.5 \times I_{sc.}$ bottom: EL of the same module at $0.2 \times I_{sc.}$ [35]		
Severity		·		<u>⊢</u> <u>+</u> ,3 <u>+</u> -,1	

Component Defect	Module Metallisation discolouration	on/corros	ion		PVFS 1-11 vs.01		
Appearance	The discolouration and/or corrosion of the cell metallisation and the interconnections is getting visible as a light yellow to dark brown to black discolouration of the electrical parts. Depending on the material combinations corrosion is furthermore noticeable by the presence of galvanic products that may appear powdery, white, light gray, and/or have a yellow, blue, or green tinge. The defect occurs typically at the solder bonds, on the cell gridlines/fingers or the cell/string interconnect ribbons. It is very often observed together with other failures like de-lamination and discolouration of the encapsulant and sometimes with burn marks . Under certain circumstances corrosion is more visible near cell edges. Dark areas at the cell borders of the EL images can here highlight the diffusion of moisture through the rear side of the module and the gaps between the cells and the subsequent front side cell corrosion starting from the edges.						
Detection	VI, (EL, IV)						
Origin	The corrosion/oxidation of the metallisation is caused by the presence of moisture and acidity in the encapsulant, as e.g. acetic acid, a degradation product of the mostly used encapsulant EVA or remaining crosslinker (peroxides). Acetic acid has a corrosive effect on the cell metal- lisation and the cell interconnect. The ingress of moisture caused by an ongoing delamination process leads together with the oxygen to a further acceleration of the corrosion. Corrosion can be caused by a poor manufacturing process (e.g residual crosslinker due to a too short lamination process; imperfections in cell soldering) or the choice of poor materials (low corro- sion resistance of tin-based coating of copper ribbons, high water permeability of back sheet and/or encapsulant materials). Environmental factors can accelerate the corrosion (e.g am- monia, salt, humidity, temperature). For these reasons, corrosion is more frequent and severe under hot and humid climates or in agriculture or maritime environments. Discolouration can be also related to non-corrosive processes like a discolouration due to light-sensitive solder flux residues on the ribbon.						
	Production	Installatio	n 🗌	Opera	ation		
Impact	The metallisation, and/or interce therefore losses in module per metallisation discolouration wit issue. Locally increased series significant, it can trigger the by Safety:	formance. hout corros resistance	The power loss sion. The defect of leads to current	is less pron does not au mismatch.	ounced for modules with tomatically pose a safety If the mismatch is getting		
Mitigation		Dravantiv					
Mitigation	Corrective action	Preventiv (recomme		(optic	entive actions onal)		
			alidity of IEC 61 on and BOM.	215 Regu	lar system inspections.		

EXAMPLES	(page1)		PVFS 1-11 vs.01
Examples 1-3			
	Discolouration due to corrosion or to light-sensitive flux residues on the ribbon.	Discolouration due to corrosion on the ribbon. [SUPSI]	String interconnect corrosion. [1]
Severity	• •		
Examples 4-6			
	Cell interconnect corrosion. [1]	Modules with light Ag finger oxi- dation after 5 years in the field. [41]	Severe oxidation/corrosion and burn marks on the Ag fingers, busbars, and interconnects of modules after 25 years. [41]
Severity			e + 2 3 4 +
Examples 7-9			
	Corrosion seen as red, green and black discolouration in the string interconnect. [41]	Busbar corrosion and delamina- tion at the edge. [SUPSI]	Glass/glass module showing de- lamination and subsequent cor- rosion. [1]
Severity	€ € ⊢2345	€ ⊢3 4 5	● ●

Component Defect	Module Glass corrosion or abrasic	on	PVFS 1-12 vs.0					
Appearance	The degradation of the glass front layer is getting visible as a homogenous or heterogeneous change in colour and transparency of the glass. The affected glass surface can appear hazy or milky and in some cases also rougher compared to the non-degraded module/module area. Increased susceptibility to soling could be observed.							
Detection	VI, (IV)							
Origin	To optimise the efficiency and appearance of a PV module most manufacturers apply some anti-reflective coatings (ARC), anti-soiling coatings (ASC) or multilayer coatings on the front of their modules. 1-3% more power can be obtained by these techniques respect to module with uncoated glass. Corrosion or abrasion of these layers can however, reduce or vanish the effectiveness of these coatings. Glass corrosion is caused by atmospheric humidity in combination with gases or particles present in the atmosphere (e.g. pollutants, salt, ammonia) and the glass. It happens for example when water (dew) dissolves some of the sodium ions from the top of the soda lime glass, leading to the production of an alkali base that can then corrode the glass silicate. Glass abrasion or corrosion can be also caused by inappropriate cleaning techniques (mechanical removal techniques, inappropriate cleaning agents) which damage or removes the coatings. Abrasion occurs mostly in the desert, due to the combination of wind, sand and dust which causes abrasion and frosting of the glass surface.							
	Production	Installation	Operation					
Impact	a power loss. The power loss i except in the case where the s	lass front layer lowers the trans s generally limited to a few per soiling susceptibility is significan ad Maintenance (O&M) costs ca	smission of the glass, leading rcent and is saturating over tim ntly increased and larger losse					
	Safety:	Performance: ⊣	2 3 4 -1					
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recommended)	Preventive actions (optional)					
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced. Depends on the level of performance loss. For extreme environments (e.g. near to mines, cement facto- ries), evaluate cost-effective- ness of replacing modules with lost yield.	Check validity of IEC 61215 certification and BOM, appro- priate component selection in function of intended applica- tion.	- 1					

EXAMPLES	6 (page1)					PVFS 1-12 vs.01
Examples 1-3		e with hazy glass iscoloration) due sion. [45]		e with hazy glass discoloration) due sion. [43]		plass due to glass corro- pse to frame. [44]
Severity		H2		+23		H2
Examples 4-5	Glass corrosion damp heat 90/90		nono-Si back-con	tact module after	Glass of	corrosion. [46]
Severity			F			<u>⊢</u> <u></u> 4 – 1

Component Defect	Module Defect or detached junctio	on box			PVFS 1-13 vs.01			
Appearance	The junction box housing and lid appears either defect (weathered, brittle, cracked, warped, melted or burned) and/or detached (open or loose lid, shifted or detached junction box from backsheet). The sealant/adhesive material with which the junction box is attached to the backsheet can be weathered or appear as yellowed. The sealing components/material around the wire entrance or the lid can be damaged (squeezed, broken, brittle) or completely missing.							
Detection	VI							
Origin	Junction box detachment results from poor fixing of the junction box to the backsheet or use of low quality adhesive. Acrylic or PE Foam tapes were used as junction box attachment ma- terial in early years, but they frequently loss stickiness at low temperature and result in de- tachment. Use of inadequate IP rating junction box may cause water intrusion and subsequent failure. Opened or badly closed j-boxes may due to poor manufacturing process or air pres- sure caused by high temperature for boxes with no exhaust path. Delamination near a junction box can cause it to become loose. Improper handling or mounting of the modules can be also the cause of damages the j-box, like pulling modules up on the cables before mounting, or missing cable fixing or usage of too short cabling to interconnect modules to a string, causing frequent or permanent mechanical stress on the j-boxes.							
	Production	Installatio	n 🔲	Opera	ation			
Impact	A defect or detached junction nections, leading to performant quent initiation of fire. Furthern contacts within the junction box electrical components.	nce losses more, a loc	and increasing risk on ose junction box is put	of elec [.] Itting n	trical arcing and subse- nechanical stress on the			
	Safety:		Performance:		12345			
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventiv (recomm		Preve (optic	entive actions onal)			
Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced or repaired. Regular inspections should be done to monitor the status of the not replaced modules.		certification Ground f	validity of IEC 61215 Regular system in tion and BOM. fault detection by in- r other devices at all		lar system inspections.			

EXAMPLE	S (page1)			P١	VFS 1-1:	3 vs.01
Examples 1-3						
	Poorly bonded junction b the backsheet. [16]	ox on Open junction t [41]	box in the field.	Detached backsheet.	•	ox from
Severity			12345	1	1 2 3	3 4 5
Examples 4-5						
	Left: Missing junction box Right: Good junction box se		ion of contacts.	-	al or strain bles, improp	
Severity	f e	12345			12	3 4 5
Examples 6-7	Melted junction box. [TUV F	Rhein- Burned junction	box caused by			
	land]		icts within the			
Severity		5 6 0				

Component Defect	Module Junction box interconnection failure							
Appearance	Not connected, broken, burned, corroded or short circuited parts within the junction box. It can involve solder joints, wires, bypass diodes or tabbing ribbons. The interconnection failure itself could be hidden by the potting material in the junction box and be visible only by removing the potting material. The material can appear as degraded (yellowed, browned, burned or bubbled) due to the heat or arcing occurring in the junction box.							
Detection	IRT, (VI, IV, VOC)							
Origin	Bad contacts or moisture ingress may be the cause of interconnection failures in the junction box. Contacts are either soldered, screwed or inserted (mechanical spring clamping). Bad soldering contacts are caused by low soldering temperature (cold solder point) or chemical residuals of the previous production process on the solder joints. Bad mechanical contacts are caused by loose clamping or screws. Mechanical contacts can get loose due to the thermal cycling of day and night and seasonal changes. Moisture ingress in bad or damaged junction boxes (e.g. adhesion loss, brittled, cracked, missing seal at wire entrance or junction box hous- ing) leads to corrosion of the contacts. Delamination near the junction box can cause it to become loose, putting mechanical stress on the contacts within the junction box and breaking them.							
	Production	Installatio	on 🗌	Opera	ation			
Impact	Bad contacts or corrosion c box. Resistive heating can encpasulant/backsheet behi worst case interconnection f The heat can be detected v failures can also lead to sign of a module or a string. The stress conditions. Intercon- initiate fire.	moreover nd and arou ailures caus vith a IR car ificant power neasuremen	result in discolourat nd the junction box a es a short circuit or in nera. In addition to th losses, which can be at can be affected by c	ion and to aternal atervisu detect hangin	nd burn marks in the glass breakage . In the arcing within the j-box. The all defects, interconnect ed by measuring the V_{oc} g mechanical or thermal			
	Safety:		Performance:	•	1 2 3 4 5			
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventiv (recomm		Preve (optio	ntive actions nal)			
	Modules with a direct safe risk or a severity of 5 shoul be replaced. Regular inspe- tions should be done to mor tor the status of the not re placed modules.	d certification	Check validity of IEC 61215 certification and BOM. Ground fault detection by in- verter or other devices at all time.		ng of modules with mo- st centre before installa- regular system inspec- nstallation of arc detec- pol.			

EXAMPLE	S (page1)				PVF	S 1-14vs.01
Examples 1-3						
	Junction box v [16]	vith poor wiring.	Detached tabbir bad soldering. [?	ng ribbon due to 16]		re due to water IP65 rated Jbox.
Severity	<u></u>	<u> </u>	<u></u>	<u> </u>	F	⊢2345
Examples 4-6						
	Jbox failure due connection. [41]	e to poor electric		se screw connec- with browning of	sing ribbon to	of module bus- the Jbox connec- pad with minor tant. [41]
Severity			•	⊢2345	•	⊢2345
Examples 7-9					Ar1	302.4
	interconnect lea	e to the poor Jbox ading to light dis- urn mark on front 41]	-	e to the poor Jbox eading to burn breakage. [41]		hotspot Jbox due ic connection in-
Severity	f e m	<u>⊢</u>	f e m	<u>⊢</u>	f e m	<u>⊢</u> 3 4 5


Component Defect		Module Missing or insufficient bypass diode protection PVFS 1-15vs.01						
Appearance	Missing, dis	sconnected, inverte	d, damage	d, open circuited	or short c	rcuited bypass diode.		
Detection	BYT, (IV, IF	RT, EL, STM)						
Origin	voltages du the diodes working con are used as discharges open circui shortened i to high volta diode is sin	Bypass diodes fail either because they are undersized or because they are exposed to high oltages due to lightning strikes or other high voltage events. In addition to these two reasons, he diodes have a certain ppm of failure rate, that is the nature of the component. For diodes vorking constantly at high temperatures this failure rate increases. Typically, Schottky diodes are used as bypass diodes in PV modules, but they are very susceptible to static high voltage lischarges and mechanical stress. Two main failure modes are observed with bypass diodes: open circuit or short circuit. Short circuit condition occurs when the bypass diode is physical hortened in the junction box, it is mounted the wrong way around or when it has been exposed to high voltages like lightning strikes or static electricity. Open circuit condition occurs when a liode is simply missing, it is not properly connected, a strong current damaged the diode, or it is undersized and not resisting to a continuous current flow.						
	Production		Installatio	n 🗌	Ope	ration		
Impact	module and verse bias through the for the cell case, fire. T to these ris the module power point due to hea	d to avoid the rever- voltage of the solar of bypass diode and and may evolve ho The problem is that ks. A short circuited but also of other m t. Bypass diode failu	se biasing cells. In the a cell can b t spots that the failure d bypass di odules wit ures somet junction bo	of single solar c case of an open be reversed with may cause bro will be not detec ode will continue hin its string by c imes cause the ju ox. When the ju	ells higher circuited of a higher v wning, bu ted until th busly lowe causing a s unction bo unction bo	partial shading on the PV than the allowed cell re- liode no current is flowing oltage than it is designed rn marks or, in the worst he module is not exposed r the power production of shift off of their maximum x to deform or even burnt c or backsheet are burnt		
	Safety:	<u></u>		Performance:	1234	5		
Mitigation	Corrective actions Preventive actions (recommended)				entive actions onal)			
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced. Regular inspec- tions should be done to moni- tor the status of the not re- placed modules.		Check bypass diode dimen- sioning, commissioning of system with IRT.		of odes befo	ng of module bypass di- with mobile test centre re installation. Regular nspections.		

Component Defect	Module Not conform power rating	I		PVFS 1-16 vs.01					
Appearance		The STC output power of a brand new module is below a specified tolerance limit or the min- imum nameplate output power is not clearly specified by the manufacturer.							
Detection	IV, (MON)								
Origin	pends on the product variabili ment uncertainty. The quality applied in production for the product variability. The devia sources of uncertainty, for exa ature, calibration of the solar s equipment, connectors and ca has to take into account any t 17). This means that after a fi to be within the rated power performing the STC performa have to be stabilised accordin specific test requirements are pending on the technology, a verification of power ratings. F	Deviations of the measured power of a single module respect to the name plate power de- dends on the product variability, manufacturing quality, the labelling policy and the measure- ment uncertainty. The quality of cells (e.g. LID susceptibility) together with the binning method applied in production for the reduction of mismatch losses, has a significant impact on the roduct variability. The deviations in the measurement in the factory comes from several ources of uncertainty, for example the environment temperature, measured module temper- ture, calibration of the solar simulation, maintenance of the reference module, measurement equipment, connectors and cables. According to the international standards, the power rating as to take into account any technology related initial degradation effects (for c-Si see FS 1- 7). This means that after a first exposure to light the output power of a new module has still to be within the rated power tolerance. The measurement uncertainty of the test laboratory erforming the STC performance test has therefore to be taken into account. The modules have to be stabilised according the procedure described in IEC 61215-2:2021. Technology pecific test requirements are described in IEC 61215-1-4:2021. De- tending on the technology, a maximum allowable measurement uncertainty is defined for the erification of power ratings. For c-Si modules it is specified as 3%. A PV module is considered to be conform to the IEC61215 standard, when following criterion (gate 1) is fulfilled:							
	$P_{\max}(\text{Lab}) \cdot \left(1 + \frac{\frac{1.65}{2} m_1 [\%]}{100}\right) \ge P_{\max}(\text{NP}) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{ t_1 [\%]}{100}\right)$								
	P _{max} (Lab): measured maximum ST P _{max} (NP): minimum rated namepla	C power of each module in stabiliz ate power of each module without		on tolerances					
	m ₁ : measurement uncertain	ty in % of laboratory for P_{max} (expa	anded combine	ed uncertainty (k = 2)					
	t ₁ : manufacturer's rated low The minimum nameplate pow nameplate or data sheet valu the nameplate value, the mod stated on the nameplate or the value on the nameplate or da uncertainty components are s	es. If the $P_{max}(NP)$ derived fulle can be considered to be datasheet, then $t_1 = 0$. If the ata sheet (for example, if m	rance t_1 has from the date not conform tolerance is nultiple toler	tasheet is different from m. If the tolerance is not s not reduced to a single rances or measurement					
	Production	Installation	Opera	ation					
Impact	A non-conform STC power ra safety issue, but it has a nega incorrect estimation of the inst tions and investor expectation	ative impact on the lifetime e alled STC power has a direc	energy yield	and financial return. An					
	Safety:	Performance:	1 2 3	_					
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recommended)	Preve (optio	ntive actions nal)					
	Confirm underperformance through an accredited PV test laboratory. Claim for missing power.	nfirm underperformance Verify power warranties and Independ bugh an accredited PV test data sheet conformity, pur- oratory. Claim for missing chase modules from trusted and/or ar							

EXAMPLES (page1)

PVFS 1-16vs.01

Examples				
1	a)	Maximum power (P_{max}) 300 W $\pm 3 \%$ Maximum power voltage (V_{mp}) 37 V Maximum power current (I_{mp}) $8,1 \text{ A}$ Open circuit voltage ^a (V_{∞}) $45,9 \text{ V}$ Short circuit current ^a (I_{5c}) $8,9 \text{ A}$ Maximum DC system voltage $1 000 \text{ V}$ * +5 % / -0 % tolerance	Product Z series Electrical Data at STCPeak power watts $\pm 3 \% - P_{max}(W)$ 300 305 310 Maximum power voltage - $V_{mp}(V)$ 37 $37,2$ $37,5$ Maximum power current (I_{mp}) (A) $8,1$ $8,2$ $8,27$ Open circuit voltage ^a - $V_{cc}(V)$ $45,9$ $45,9$ $45,9$ Short circuit current ^a - I_{5c} (A) $8,9$ $8,92$ $8,98$ Module efficiency - η_m (%)1414,214,4 $^a \pm 5 \%$ / -0 % tolerance on I_{sc} and V_{oc} Product X series	P_{max} (NP) = 300 W; t_1 = 3 % V_{oc} (NP) = 45,9 V; t_2 = 5 % I_{sc} (NP) = 8,9 A; t_3 = 5 %
	b)	Maximum power (P_{max}) 296 to 300 W Maximum power voltage (V_{mp}) 37 V Maximum power current (I_{mp}) 8,1 A Open circuit voltage ^a (V_{∞}) 45,9 V Short circuit current ^a (I_{sc}) 8,9 A Maximum DC system voltage 1 000 V ^a ±4 % production tolerance	$ \begin{array}{c c} \hline \textbf{Electrical Data at STC} \\ \hline \hline Peak power watts^{a} - P_{max}(W) & 296 to 301 to 306 to 300 & 305 & 310 \\ \hline Maximum power voltage - V_{rep}(V) & 37 & 37,2 & 37,5 \\ \hline Maximum power current (I_{rep})(A) & 8,1 & 8,2 & 8,27 \\ \hline Open circuit voltage^{a} - V_{cc}(V) & 45,9 & 45,9 & 45,9 \\ \hline Short circuit current^{a} - I_{ac}(A) & 8,9 & 8,92 & 8,98 \\ \hline Module efficiency - \eta_m (\%) & 14 & 14,2 & 14,4 \\ \hline {}^{a} \pm 4 \% \ production \ tolerance \\ \hline \end{array}$	$P_{max} (NP) = 296 W; t_1 = 0 \%$ $V_{oc}^{r} (NP) = 45,9 V; t_2 = 4 \%$ $I_{sc} (NP) = 8,9 A; t_3 = 4 \%$ If t_1 is not specified, it is taken to be 0.
	c)	$\begin{split} & \frac{\text{Product Y300W}}{\text{Maximum power }(P_{\max})} & \frac{300 \text{ W}}{\pm 3 \text{ \% }/-0} \\ & \frac{1}{300 \text{ W}} \\ & $	$\label{eq:product Y series} \begin{tabular}{lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	$P_{max} (NP) = 300 W; t_1 = 0 \%$ $V_{oc}^{c} (NP) = 45.9 V; t_2 = 2 \%$ $I_{sc} (NP) = 8,9 A; t_3 = 2 \%$ $t_2 is not reduced to a single value. Thus, the smaller value is chosen. The same situation exists for t_3.$
	d)	Maximum power (P_{max}) 300 W Power selection ($\pm 5 \text{ W}$) 300 W Maximum power voltage (V_{mp}) 37 V Maximum power current (I_{mp}) $8,1 \text{ A}$ Open circuit voltage (V_{cc}) $45,9 \text{ V}$ Short circuit current (I_{gc}) $8,9 \text{ A}$ Maximum DC system voltage 1000 V $\pm 3 \%$ tolerance on P_{max} , I_{sc} , V_{oc}	$\begin{array}{c} \label{eq:product T series} \\ \hline Peak power watts^a - P_{max}(W) & 300 & 310 \\ \hline Maximum power voltage - V_{mp}(V) & 37 & 37,5 \\ \hline Maximum power current (I_{mp})(A) & 8,1 & 8,27 \\ \hline Open circuit voltage^a - V_{oc}(V) & 45,9 & 45,9 \\ \hline Short circuit current^a - I_{oc}(A) & 8,9 & 8,98 \\ \hline Module efficiency - \eta_m (\%) & 14 & 14,4 \\ a^{*} \pm 3 \% tolerance on P_{max}, I_{sc}, V_{oc} \end{array}$	Fails to meet requirements of IEC 61215-1 5.2.2. Lower edge of power bin is 295 W on nameplate, but is 300 W on datasheet.
	IEC 612		me plate and datasheet values with on the nd tolerances in comparison to a hypothe 2021]	-
Severity			NA	



Component Defect		duced degradatior	n in c-Si n	nodules (LID	/LeTID) PV	/FS 1-17 vs.01
Appearance	Light induced degradation in crystalline silicon modules is recognisable mainly as a drop in STC output power, but also short circuit current and open circuit voltage, within the initial life- time of a PV system. It isn't correlated with any visual defect or other failure modes. Increasing non-uniformity of electroluminescence images (patchwork pattern) can in some cases high- light an ongoing degradation process.						
Detection	IV, (EL, If	RT)					
Origin	Two different light induced degradation effects are known: LID (light induced degradation) and LeTID (light and elevated temperature induced degradation). Both degradation modes occur at cell level, but the physical mechanism staying behind them are different. The first is related to the concentration of boron and oxygen in the cells, whereas the second one is probably correlated to the concentration of hydrogen in the cell, but the mechanisms are still not fully understood. Mainly p-type multi and mono crystalline silicon modules are affected. High-efficiency cell technologies that use n-type wafers, such as n-type PERC, HJT, or n-PERT seem to be much less or not at all concerned by these two degradation effects. LID occurs only within the first days of exposure to the sun and is limited to 1-3%, whereas LeTID is in a more severe and long-term light induced degradation mechanism. LeTID was observed for the first time with the introduction of PERC modules on the market. The degradation can reach up to 10% and sum-up with the LID loss. It occurs only at elevated temperature above 50 °C. The speed with which the degradation is reached the modules can regenerate, recovering the lost power. This process is however very slow and also climate dependent. The lost power may even not recover over the typically expected 25-year lifetime of a module. There exist approaches of accelerated regeneration of LeTID-sensitive modules in the field, but they are not very user-friendly. Over the last years always more manufacturers adapted their cell production of LeTID and depending on the methodology the degradation rates, even if reduced, can differ from one manufacturer to the other and range from 1-4%.						
	Productio	n	Installatio	n 🗌		Operation	
Impact	LID or LETID causes no safety problems, but it has a negative impact on the lifetime energy yield and financial return. An under-estimation of the initial degradation has a direct impact of the energy yield predictions and investor expectations. LID is less critical for the investor because it is generally less severe and it is taken into account by the manufacturers where labelling the modules and defining the first year warranty, whereas a high LeTID degradation rate and the difficulty to predict the trend over time is much more critical for manufacturer warranties and system owners. The sensitivity of PV modules to LeTID can be tested in the laboratory. Serious LID above 10% degradation may result in hotspot and can be detected to the camera, it happened mainly to the cells produced when PERC were just commercialize and no mitigation of LID in the manufacturing process was available.						s a direct impact on al for the investors, anufacturers when LeTID degradation for manufacturers' an be tested in the can be detected by
	Safety:			Performance:	⊢2	31	
Mitigation	Corrective	e actions	Preventiv mended)	e actions (re		Preventive tional)	actions (op-
	•	underperformance in accredited PV test y. Claim for missing	ify the u	wer warranties se of LeTID s odule manufac	stable cturer.	power loss tions. Stipu agreement	est reports with % for realistic estima- ulate a contractual on tolerated loss. dual modules. Ver- ell type).

Component Defect	Module Insulation failure				PVFS 1-18vs.01	
Appearance	A module with bad insulation b world) are not directly visible in measurement of the insulation humid/wet conditions. It can be can potentially lead to insulation or in the early morning when t tected by the inverter (low insu- value falls below a certain limit	by eye. An resistance sometime on problem he PV mod lation fault	unequivocally de e of the module us es deduced by th s. Under certain dules are covere	etection is under dry (e presence circumsta d by dew,	only possible through a (≥40 Mohm/m ²) or better e of visual defects which inces like after a rain fall this kind of defect is de-	
Detection	INS, (MON)	NS, (MON)				
Origin	Insulation failures can have different causes. It can occur in the design/production phase of a module, due to solar cells too closely positioned to the frame or to material weaknesses like the use of inadequate encapsulation or backsheet materials or a poor lamination process. In the installation phase it can be caused by mechanical damages of the module, whereas in the operational phase it is generally caused by catastrophic events or due to a delamination process close to the edge of the module or water ingress or condensation in the junction box. Modules with failed or skipped insulation test in production due to an insufficient quality assurance could be also the origin of the problem. Various module failures are at the origin of an insulation failure: backsheet and encapsulant delamination, backsheet damages, burn marks, glass breakage .					
	Production	Installatio	n 🔲	Oper	ation	
Impact	A low insulation resistance at r inverter failure occurs. The pre a safety hazard exposing perso parts of the string or frame can measuring instruments.	sence of ar	n electrical leakage ential electric sho	ge current ock hazard	to the frame can become . Touching non-insulated	
	Safety:		Performance:	1234	5	
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventiv (recomm		Preve (optic	entive actions onal)	
	risk or a severity of 5 should certification and BOM, com- Insulation				lar system inspections, ation testing of modules mobile test centre before lation.	

Component	Module					PVFS 1-19 vs.01	
Defect	Hot-spot	(thermal patterns	5)				
Appearance	deviates fro such as e.g to irreversi age . The p gress of th and irradia	om the normal behave g. infrared thermogra ble hot-spot damage position, size, intensione failure, but also u	viour of a m aphy. Hot s es like e.g. ty and patt inder which ature gradi	odule. It can be o spots are not visi local yellowing ern of the hot-sp n conditions the	detecte ble by , burn oot/s de modul	g or a thermal pattern which ed only by imaging techniques the naked eye until they lead marks, glass or cell break - epends on the origin and pro- e is operating (shading, load K is considered as normal and	
Detection	IRT, (VI)						
Origin	crack and a der joints, production reverse bia is high eno of solder, o the effects	A hot spot may be caused by shading, soiling, severe cell mismatch, damaged cells (e.g. cell crack and shunted cells), glass breakage, poor electrical connections (e.g. bad or broken sol- ler joints, short circuits, cell interconnect ribbon failures), or low quality solar cell or module broduction. When such a condition occurs, the affected cell or group of cells is forced into everse bias and will dissipate power, which can cause overheating. If the power dissipation is high enough or localised enough, the reverse biased cell(s) can overheat resulting in melting of solder, deterioration of the encapsulant and/or backsheet and glass breakage. To reduce the effects of hot spots bypass diodes are connected in parallel to the cells. Well-dimensioned and correctly working bypass diodes helps in reducing hot spot damages from occurring.					
	Production		Installatio	n 📃	(Operation	
Impact	module pro do not indi an insignifi vated bypa to a reduc when more warmer ce or when it unproblem gradients a compound increase in plant if the tained at a bird droppi later stage	oduction, thermal ab cate a special qualit icant power loss. Po ass diode leads to a r tion of the total mode e modules are affect lls. Module safety is leads to a fire. A ter above 20 K are exp may even degrade temperature gradie modules are not re suitable frequency, ings or power mism	d to a power loss. Due to normal tolerances in cell sorting and abnormalities of less than 10% of the recorded modules usually lity issue. Most of the times modules with a single hot cell have Power reduction becomes significant when a permanently acti- minimized power output of the affected solar cell string and thus odule power output. The impact on system level is only visible oted. Very high losses can occur when PID is the origin of the saffected when the overheating causes critical module damages emperature gradient in a range of 10 K to 20 K is considered as easing during the operation of the PV power plant. Temperature spected to cause power losses; in extreme cases, the material e, resulting in a safety issue during maintenance work. Further lient are expected during the operation phase of the PV power eplaced. If PV modules of a system are not cleaned and main- v, high temperatures of some cells or modules may occur due to match for a long time which may lead to module damage. At a to evaluate whether the damage was caused by quality problems				
	Safety:	f f		Performance:	1	2 3 4 5	
Mitigation	Corrective	actions	Preventiv (recomm			Preventive actions optional)	
	Modules with a direct safety risk or a severity of 5 should be replaced or repaired. If more than 10% modules show thermal abnormalities, the reason for that behaviour should be evaluated and re- spective corrective actions should be implemented.Commissioning of system with IRT.Regular system inst				Regular system inspections.		

EXAMPLES (page1)

PVFS 1-19vs.01

Pattern	Description	Origin	Performance	Remarks	Safety	Power
	One module warmer than others		Module nor- mally fully func- tional	Check wiring		⊢ <u>'</u> ''5
	One row (sub- string) is warmer than other rows in the module	Short circuited (SC) or open sub-string - Bypass diode SC, or - Internal SC	-	May have burned spot at the module	f	⊢ <u>'</u> <u>'</u> 5
	- 3	Whole module is short circuited - All bypass diodes SC or - Wrong Connection	•	Check wiring		
	-	degradation	and FF redu-	 Change array grounding conditions recovery by reverse voltage 		⊢ 2 3 4 5 (see PVFS 1-10)
	One cell clearly warmer than the others	 Shadowing effects Defect cell Delaminated cell 	permanent, e.g.	Visual inspection needed, cleaning (cell mismatch) or shunted cell		1 2 3 4 5 (see also PVFS 1- 1, 1-3, 3-3)
	Part of a cell is warmer	 Broken cell Disconnected string interconnect 			T .	← 2 3 4 5 (see also PVFS 1- 1, 1-7, 1-9)
	Pointed heating	÷ .	•	Crack detection after detailed vis- ual inspection of the cell possible	•	← 2 3 4 5 (see also PVFS 1- 1, 1-7, 1-9)
dashed: shaded area	Sub-string part re- markably hotter than others when equally shaded	missing or	power reduction when part of this	May cause severe fire hazard when hot spot is in this sub-string		← 2 3 4 5 (see also PVFS 1- 15, 3-3)

Overview of typical IR image patterns observed in outdoor measuerments. [16]

Component Defect	Module Soiling					PVFS 1-20 vs.01
Appearance	module. The deposition	n can be u	niform o	r non-uniform an	d vary	nants on the surface of a PV in thickness. Due to the pres- seen through IRT imaging.
Detection	VI, (IRT, MON)					
Origin	Soiling of PV modules can have various origins such as dust accumulation, air pollution, bird droppings or growth of moss, lichens or algae. It can be due to natural sources, as sand in desert areas, seasonal pollen or volcanic emissions, or due to human activities, as near min- ing, industry, high ways, railways, urban or agricultural surroundings. The soiling level and its persistence over time depends on the exposure time, the chemical composition and particle size as well as the local climate conditions. Whereas rainfalls and wind can lead to a natural cleaning of modules, humidity can have a contrary effect by increasing adhesion and cemen- tation of dust on the module. The module design (e.g glass coating, frame, distance of cells from the edge), the orientation (e.g tilt angle, azimuth, landscape/portrait) and mounting con- ditions (e.g clamps, height above ground, stringing) of the modules plays an important role. Typically soiling increases as tilt angles decreases. The direction of the wind or obstacles can influence the soiling process, leading to non-uniform patterns on system and module level.					
	Production		Installat	ion 📃	C	Operation
Impact	The deposited soiling layer causes optical losses, reducing the amount of light that reaches the solar cells, with a consequential performance drop. Soiling is not a real module failure, as it is reversible when the module is cleaned, but it has a negative impact on the lifetime energy yield and financial return. Soiling is a site-specific issue. In arid regions with seasonal dry periods and dust, extreme soiling losses of up to 25%/a are reported, if modules are not cleaned. In temperate regions with year-round rain, the annual soiling losses typically ranges between 0% to 4%. In case of specific soiling sources (e.g. railway, farming, etc.) and/or constraints of the natural cleaning effect due to unfavourable mounting conditions (e.g low tilt angle) much higher losses can be observed. Non-uniform soiling leads to current mismatch losses which further increases the power loss and to hot-spots which in extreme cases can permanently damage a PV module. In modules affected by potential induced degradation (PID), soiling can further accelerate the ongoing degradation effect. Soiling can be mitigated by cleaning the modules or preventing excessive soiling. The cleaning approach has to be appropriate to the type of soiling and site specific conditions (e.g. accessibility and water availability). The cleaning schedule should take into account that natural agents, such as rain-falls, wind or dew can have a natural cleaning effect at no cost. Anti-soiling coatings (ASC) can help in reducing soiling and stretch the cleaning frequency, but only if the coating is adequate for the type of soiling present on the system and if adequate cleaning processes are followed, which do not damage the coating. Moreover, it has to be considered that some ASC can also increase transmission losses by themselves.					
	Safety:			Performance:	H_2	2 3 4 5
Mitigation	Corrective actions			ive actions mended)		Preventive actions optional)
	recommended when the reve- for the assessment of the soiling losses prior to install nue lost because of the missed soiling risk. Cost estimation tion. Installation of soiling se					Estimation or measurement of soiling losses prior to installa- ion. Installation of soiling sen- sors to determine the most profitable time to clean.

EXAMPLES	6 (page1)				PVFS	5 1-20 vs.01
Examples 1-3						
		soiling, which in is self-cleaning	Uniform heavy s rail way station.	oiling caused by [SUPSI]		iling caused by ind close mount- PSI]
Severity		F 2		H		H 2 3 1
Examples 4-6						
		on the edge of a ed with edge soil-	Soiling pattern o Atacama desert.	n a system in the . [ISE]		demonstrating lirection on a test desert. [ISE]
Severity	•	-231		<u>⊢3</u> 4 −-1		<u>⊢</u> 3 41
Examples 7	Heavy biofilm so	biling. [46]				
Severity						

Component Defect		Interconnector tor mismatch	rs				PVFS 2-1vs.01
Appearance		of male and fen g) between modul					anufacturers or types
Detection	VI, (IRT)						
Origin	it is possible advertised as duced water rials (chemica gaskets or so where extens	There is yet no standard for PV connectors prescribing dimensions and tolerances. Therefore, t is possible to find very similar-looking and even apparently fitting connectors on the market, advertised as 'compatible'. Slight differences in the design of the connector can lead to reduced water and vapour tightness. Problems may also occur due to incompatibilities of materials (chemical incompatibility or different thermal expansion parameters) of the metal contact, gaskets or sealings. Most of the time the mismatch of connectors occurs at the string end where extension cables are used or when connecting an inverter or a string combiner box, which has been delivered with incompatible connectors.					
	Production		Installatio	n 📃	C	Operatio	on 🗖
Impact	The interconnection of connectors from different manufacturers may significantly increase the risk of loss of performance and defects which cause hazards for human and environment [IEC TR 63225:2019]. The consequences are e.g. contact corrosion , burnt connectors, electrical arcing and in the worth case a fire . One of the most common failures is that no current will flow through the connection at all. The problems do not manifest themselves right away, but only over time with increasing contact resistance and/or degradation of the connector/s. At humid weather conditions mismatching connectors can also lead to a partial failure of the inverter or a ground fault. The fire risk is further increased when the connectors are not properly positioned and are close to flammable material such as wooden roof beams or heat-insulation materials. Often connectors are at least partly installed at position where they cannot be inspected during normal visual inspections (e.g. within profiles, underneath roof parallel modules or even in BIPV). In combination with the unclear compatibility issue, the interconnection of different brand or type of connectors may result in high risks.						
	Safety:	e		Performance:	1 2	345	
Mitigation	Corrective ac	otions	Preventiv (recomme			Preventi optional	ve actions I)
	ors should be replaced. ule/inverter spec sheets for inverters are del the type/manufacturer of con- nector, only connectors from the same manufacturer and string cables with					at both modules and a are delivered with the connectors. Provi- spare connectors and ables with connectors ame type as the mod- nectors.	

EXAMPLES	S (page1)			F	PVFS 2-1 vs.01
Examples 1-2	Connectors (male of female) are of different brand or type and obviously do not match. [40]	Connectors (mal of different brand viously do not m	d or type and ob-		
Severity		f e	1		
Examples 3-5					
	Corroded connector due to cross- mating. [Stäubli]	Melted connector mating. [Stäubli]	or due to cross-	Burned comment	onnector due to cross- Stäubli]
Severity	f e - 3 4 5	f e	<u> </u>	f e	·-·
Examples 6-7	Different types of connectors reco ferent body mouldings and cable of guide]	ognisable by dif-			Logo TUV Logo TUV TV TV Logo MC4 brand
Severity			f		1

Component Defect	Cables and Interconnector Defect DC connector/cable				PVFS 2-2 vs.01		
Appearance	Opened connectors can demo	A damaged connector or cable appear as melted, burned, brittle, broken, cracked or whitened. Opened connectors can demonstrate corrosion. Affected connectors show very often over- heating or hot spots in an early state if a thermography check is performed.					
Detection	VI, (IRT)						
Origin	nents (DC connector mismate the connectors are either not in tion, exposure to rain or pollute connectors are not fixed correct allowing the connector to dry co- use of low quality material in p quate selection of components ble glands, inadequate IP class the cables in the installation ph cables close to connections,	One of the major causes of damaged connectors are the combination of incompatible compo- nents (DC connector mismatch), a low quality connector or a bad installation. In the last case he connectors are either not installed according the instructions (e.g. bad crimping or connec- ion, exposure to rain or polluted before installation, installation of damaged connectors) or the connectors are not fixed correctly exposing them over longer times to humidity or dirt without allowing the connector to dry completely. In case of damaged cables the major causes are the use of low quality material in production (e.g. insulation material or cupper wires), an inade- quate selection of components within the design phase (e.g. undersized cables, too large ca- ble glands, inadequate IP classification or UV protection) or an improper handling or fixing of he cables in the installation phase (e.g. cable routing over sharp or abrading edges, hanging cables close to connections, overly tight bending, missing or not correctly installed cable glands or exposure to direct UV radiation).					
	Production	Installatio	n 🔲	Ор	eration		
Impact	Damaged connectors or cables the whole string. The continuit can occur (low insulation fault losses. In the worst case dama tric arcs. In many cases, the o such as wooden roof beams creasing the risk of fire.	y of the cir is or invert aged cables connectors	cuit isn't any mo er switch off), le s or not well-con and cables are	ore guara eading to nected co much clo	nteed and inverter failures partial or complete power onnectors may cause elec- oser to flammable material		
	Safety:		Performance:	123	4 5		
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventiv mended)	e actions (rec	com- Pre tior	eventive actions (op- nal)		
	Components constituting a direct safety risk should be replaced. Regular inspections should be done to monitor the status of the not replaced components.	t safety risk should be cables from humidity during agreement for maintenance. ced. Regular inspec- should be done to moni- the status of the not re- should be done to re- should be done by trained staller, perform regular					

EXAMPLES	(page1)				P١	/FS 2-2vs.01
Examples 1-3						
	Weathered conn	ector. [1]	Cracked connec	tor. [1]	Corroded co	onnector. [1]
Severity	f e	⊢2 31	f e	<u> </u>	f f	· · · · 3 4 · · ·
Examples 4-6						
	Not fully inserte connecter. [41]	ed or interlocked	Melted connecto	or. [1]	Cracked/dis sulation. [1]	integrated cable in-
Severity	f	H 2 3 I	f	+-+4 5		2 3 4 5
Examples 7	Incorrect crimpin	ng (right) versus co	prrect crimping (le	eft). [47]		
Severity	f e		H 2 3 I			

EXAMPLES	(page2)			PVFS 2-2 vs.01
Examples 8-10				
	Burned connector. [1]	Corroded Cable. [1]	Animal	bite on cable. [1]
Severity				

Component Defect	Cables and Interconnectors Insulation failure PVFS 2-3vs.01						
Appearance	A bad isolation of cables is no sible through the measuremen It can be sometimes deduced nectors. Under certain circum cables or connectors are expo (low insulation fault or inverter	nt of the insu I by the pre istances lik osed to hun	ulation resistance usence of degrade e after a rain fall hidity, this kind of d	inder dry o d or damag or in the e	r humid/wet conditions. ged cables and/or con- arly morning when the		
Detection	VI, (INS, MON)	VI, (INS, MON)					
Origin		solation failures occurs as a result of a short-circuit. It is usually the result of a combination of umidity and damaged or degraded DC cables or connectors .					
	Production	Installatio	n 🗌	Operat	ion 🔲		
Impact	A low insulation resistance due to the cables or a connector does not lead to a performance loss itself, until an inverter failure occurs. An isolation fault can however cause potentially fatal voltages in the conducting parts of the system potentially exposing persons to an electric shock hazard. Touching of non-insulated parts may cause severe injury, without the use of safety gear and safe measuring instruments. In the worst case damaged cables or connectors may cause electric arcs and initiate a fire.						
	Safety:		Performance:	⊢234	5		
Mitigation	Corrective actions	Preventiv (recomme		Preven (option	tive actions al)		
	Cables or connectors con- stituting a direct safety risk should be replaced. Regular inspections should be done to monitor the status of the not replaced components.	verter or time.	ault detection by i other devices at	•	r system inspections.		

Component Defect	Cables and Interconnectors Thermal damage in combiner box						FS 2-4vs.01
Appearance		appearing in the com maged parts can be t					
Detection	VI, IRT, (VI, IRT, (MON)					
Origin	(e.g unde	nermal damages in the combiner box can be due to the selection of inadequate components of underrated fuses or fuse holders), a not proper connection of DC cables (e.g improper re torqueing, missing fuses) or a wrong wiring of the modules/strings in the field or on-roof.					
	Productio	n 🗖	Installatio	n 🔲	Operation		
Impact	ors/cable losses, el	age is caused by the es. The partial or comp ectrical shock hazard I to prevent further da	olete therm s and risk c	al damage of the	e com	ibiner box lea	ds to performance
	Safety:	(f) (e) (m) (f) (e	m	Performance:	1	2 3 4 5	
Mitigation	Corrective	e actions		Preventive actions Preventive actions (optional)			actions
	•	he components with abnormal tempera-	•				

EXAMPLES	6 (page1)		FS 2-4vs.01
Examples 1-3	Burned terminal block of the combiner box. [TUV Rheinland]	Improper wire torqueing causes a fire. [46]	Connection show signs of corrosion. [TUV Rheinland]
Severity		f e m	
Examples 4	Connecting terminals show signs of burning, have melted or charred. [TUV Rheinland]		
Severity			

Component Defect	Mounting Bad module clamping				PVFS 3-1 vs.01		
Appearance	Inadequate fastening or dam	age of the m	nodule or frame by	the clamp.			
Detection	VI						
Origin	not followed. Typical errors clamps for the selected m glass/glass modules, wrong short and too narrow clamps not being chosen in accorda	The installation instructions of the module and mounting structure from the manufacturer are not followed. Typical errors at the planning and installation stage are: (a) use of inadequate clamps for the selected module and/or mounting structure, e.g. sharp edges damaging glass/glass modules, wrong combination of clamps and modules or mounting structure (b) too short and too narrow clamps or (c) the positions, kind or number of the clamps on the module not being chosen in accordance with the manufacturer's manual. Other errors are too exces- sively or insufficiently tightened screws during the mounting phase.					
	Production	Installatio	n	Operat	ion 🔲		
Impact	An improperly installed clamp of the module to stay in place can happen as series effect it. Once one module is detach and result in series detachme is posing a serious hazard to the property in the vicinity of breakage or cell cracks can electrical safety.	e under high because the hed, the clar ent. The deta persons an of the installa	wind or load cond modules share the mp immediately los achment of the mo d the risk of dama ation site. Problem	tions. The one clamps were string for dule/s from ging the rest such as	detachment of modules with the module next to rce on the next module the mounting structure st of the system and/or frame damage, glass		
	Safety:	m	Performance:	1234	5		
Mitigation	Corrective actions				itive actions al)		
	Modules with a safety ris or a severity of 5 should b replaced.	e (mounting clamps) a turer mo	(mounting structure/ modules/ clamps) and follow manufac- turer mounting instructions. Check local wind and snow		g of non-standard ng configurations by an ited test laboratory (eg. mounting), perform system inspections		

EXAMPLES	(page1)		PVFS 3-1 vs.01
Examples 1-3			
	Improper installation of clamp. [?]	Wrong combination of clamps and modules. [40]	Glass breakage caused by too tight screws. [35] (see also PVFS 1-8)
Severity			
Examples 4			
	Glass breakage caused by poor clamp design. [40] (see also PVFS 1-8)		
Severity			

Component Defect	Mounting Inappropriate/defect mounting structure PVFS 3-2vs.0						
Appearance		al damages (e.g crao ng holes) observable			al defects (e.g. corrosion of frame	
Detection	VI						
Origin	or snow lo structure of ditions), or conditions strength, to ities, is no propriate r vanisation leading to errors (e.g	Typically, this failure occurs when the mounting structure is not designed to withstand the wind or snow loads which are typical for the site in which the system is installed (e.g. mounting structure does not comply with static calculations, underestimation of the environmental con- ditions), or if the anchorage of the mounting structure to the ground or roof is weak (e.g. ground conditions are not considered sufficiently when choosing the mounting structure). The roof strength, to withstand the added load of the PV system and include allowance for O&M activ- ities, is not verified. Another reason for the failure of a mounting structure is the use of inap- propriate materials (e.g use of corrosive materials in a corrosive environment, insufficient gal- vanisation, poor quality material due to a bad or missing quality assurance in production), leading to a premature degradation or mechanical failure of the mounting structure. Installation errors (e.g. missing/non-original components, excessively or insufficiently tightened screws) can be the origin of a failure of the mounting structure.					
	Productior	ו 🔲	Installatio	n 📃	Operat	ion 🗖	
Impact	mounted of this leads or ground, rest of the are to be e ules/string junction to fixed on st generates	on it and in some cas to the detachment of or roof collapses, po system and/or the pr expected, depending s, glass breakage, pox) and the time an for the installation wi teel structure, espec	es also the f single mo osing a ser operty in th on the dan cell cracl nd labour r th two diffe ially in hun which frequ	e substructure (e.g dules or the whol ious hazard to per ne vicinity of the in- nage on module le (s, back sheet d needed to repair t rent metals in cor nid or costal area lently happens ar	roof insula e mounting sons and the stallation site vel (number amages , c he system. tact, for exa Direct cor bund the fa	ntegrity of the modules atton). In the worst case structure from the roof ne risk of damaging the e. Performance losses of disconnected mod- lamaged or detached Galvanic corrosion is ample aluminium frame stact of different metals stening screws. There- ostal area.	
	Safety:	f e m		Performance:	1234	5	
Mitigation	Corrective	actions	Preventiv (recomme		Prever (option	itive actions al)	
	Mounting structures with a direct safety risk should be replaced or repaired.		Use only compatible mount- ing structures (ground/mount- ing structure/modules) and follow manufacturer mounting instructions. Check local load (conditions (wind, snow, other).		nt- nd ng ad (e.g. fa	ng configurations by an	

EXAMPLE	S (page1)				PVF	S 3-2 vs.01
Examples 1-3						
	Corrosion due to s	alt water. [46]	Cracks in mounti mechanical stres	ing structure due to ss. [46]	Screw canal ben ical stress. [46]	ds due to mechan-
Severity	f e m	1 2	m	1	m	1
Examples 4-6						
	Bracket fractured of mechanical stress			ounting structure / load conditions.	Undersized mo for local wind c	ounting structure onditions. [15]
Severity	m		m	<u> </u>	m	<u>⊢ ' ' 5</u>

Component Defect	Mounting Module s					PVFS 3-3 vs.01			
Appearance	performing strings or	Depending on the position of the sun (day and time), shading can be seen either by eye when performing a visual inspection, or by comparing monitoring data of unshaded and shaded strings or by running shading simulations. The shade can have different patterns and change/move over the day and season.							
Detection	VI, (MON,	IRT)							
Origin	fluences th trees, ante cables, or can change constructio	The choice of the mounting structure and the position in which the modules are mounted in- fluences the shading conditions. Shading can be caused by different factors or obstacles e.g trees, antennas, poles, chimneys, satellite dishes, roof or façade protrusions, near buildings, cables, or by self-shading (inter array or row-to-row shading) or soiling. Shading conditions can change over the lifetime of a PV system due to growing vegetation, new constructions or construction elements. It can be distinguished between different types of shades: direct shades hindering the direct light to reach the module or diffuse shades.							
	Production		Installatio	n 🗖	Operat	ion			
Impact	lowers the systems is façade sys higher than mitigation i use of moo rithms, strii back conta prolonged glass brea resulting in the system ers and D shading co caused by diode and The choice	performance of a P between 1-5%, but tems. Due to series the shaded area. T measures like optim dule-level power ele ng control) or the us shading can lead to akage, arcing or fire to higher degradation planning phase, lat C optimizers for inconditions, but the ga the MPLE device its result in hot spot or e of using them only	V system. cenergy lo connection he final los nised string ctronics (M se of shad self does n o follow-up e). It furthe on rates. T er it is usua dividual mo in achieve self (lower en the shade y in the are	Typically, the cum sses up to 20-309 n of cells and mod s depends on the g and module arra ILPEs), inverter cl ing tolerant modu ot pose a safety is failures (e.g bur r can result in an he right time to co ally too late. The u odules can potent d by these device efficiency), and the ed cell, which incr ea where shading	ulative ann % can be o ules, the po on-site imp angements naracteristic le technolo sue, but th n marks , b acceleratio onsider the se of MLPE ially increa s do not al e shading s eases the n occurs sh	to a shading obstacle, nual shading loss of PV bserved for roof top or ower loss is significantly elementation or shading (landscape mounting), cs (MPPT search algo- gies (e.g half-cut cells, e hot-spots caused by ypass diode failures, n of the aging process impact of shading is at s such as micro-invert- se performance under ways exceeds the loss till activates the bypass risk of reliability issues. ould be considered an id be done in any case.			
	Safety:	f e m	Γ	Performance:	⊢234	5			
Mitigation	Corrective	actions	Preventiv (recomm		Prever (option	itive actions al)			
	ules with ity risk of placed or trees or ve	damaged mod- a safety or sever- f 5 should be re- repaired. Eventual egetation responsi- increased shading d be cut.	year sola ommende and perio Areas ex within the day or su be avoi ate/cost-e	effective shading m easure should be i	ec- sis sho as mates ng. system ng shadin he Perforr uld spectio pri- nit-	iled shading loss analy- buld be done which esti- and compares different and configurations and g mitigation measures. m regular system in- ons.			

EXAMPLES	S (page1)			PVF	S 3-3 vs.01
Examples 1-3					
		e-and-wire (poor e to nearby shad-]	bad planning or rwards build con- t. [40]	Shading by tre changes due to	e with seasonal foliage. [40]
Severity		H 2 3 4 H	·-···5		<u>⊢</u>
Examples 4-6					
	Missing mainte green roof. [SUF	enance on flat PSI]	g of a standard bypass diodes.	Shading by bal	ustrade. [J.Lin]
Severity	f e m	·-···5	<u>⊢</u> <u>3</u> 4 5		⊢234⊣
Examples 7	Continuous sha chimney. [SUPS	ading caused by			
Severity	f e m				

Component Defect	Inverter Overheating				PVFS 4-1vs.01			
Appearance	The inverter reduces its power or switches off to protect components from overheating (tem- perature derating). Inverters do not always deliver a corresponding status message "power reduction" or "derating". For this reason, it is recommend to check the inverter behaviour by determining and analysing performance curves (Power vs Irradiance).							
Detection	MON, (IV, IRT)							
Origin		Temperature derating of the inverter can occur for various reasons, e.g. improper installation of the inverter, fan failure, dust blocking heat dissipation or an incorrect programming of the inverters.						
	Production	Installatio	n	Operat	ion 🔲			
Impact	When the monitored component the inverter shifts its operating step-by-step. In the extreme com- perature of the threatened com- optimal operating point. The p losses, which will get worth if to off. Inverter overheating do not	point to a ase, the in ponents fa partial or co the problem	lower power. Durin verter switches off alls below the critica omplete failure of the n is not solved. In the	g this prod completel I value, the ne inverte	cess, power is reduced y. As soon as the tem- e inverter returns to the r leads to performance			
	Safety:		Performance:		5			
Action	Corrective actions		Preventive actions (recommended)		tive actions al)			
	Once identified the origin of the temperature derating the failure should be repaired. The filters and in general heat dissipation path should be cleared of obstruction.	Follow the given installation procedure, use of adequate cooling technology, perform regular inspections of the ven- tilation units.		e ature n	ring of inverter temper-			

EXAMPLES	6 (page1)					PVFS 4-1 vs.01
Examples 1-3	0 13:1	6 жасаа 15 но		6/2/2014		
	Dust blocking h tion [TUV Rhei		A soiled air filte heating [TUV F	er causes over- Rheinland]	(direct of	tion not appropriate exposition to sun) heinland]
Severity		<u>⊢</u> +_,3_+,	•	<u>⊢</u> ,3,		<u>⊢</u> <u>+</u> <u>3</u> <u>+</u> <u>+</u>

Component Defect	Inverter Incorrect installation PVFS 4-2vs.0						
Appearance	The inverter must be installed according to the installation instruction. A common failures is the installation near flammable, explosive, corrosive or humid sources. Also the minimum distances to bottom, top or to the sides are not always fulfilled. If the input cables are not fixed properly, increased temperatures can occur at the loose contact point which lead to lower performance or risk of fire. Inverters must always be accessible for operation and maintenance and properly secured to an appropriate base.						
Detection	VI (MON)						
Origin	Violating instruction manual, e.g. installed nearby flammable materials as wood or in sun light. Minimum distance to adjacent components not maintained.						
	Production	Installatio	n 🗌	Operat	ion 🗌		
Impact	Incorrect installation of the inve can result in overheating of th vapours or gases can lead to operation. Follow the instructio Direct sunlight on the inverter avoid accidents during mainter	e inverter. explosions n to provide s must be	The use of the inv s. The inverter hole e gaps from both s avoided. The inve	erter in the using can b ides and to	presence of flammable become very hot under op for adequate cooling.		
	Safety:		Performance:	1234	5		
Action	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recommended)		Prever (option	itive actions al)		
	Dismount the component and follow the installation proce- dure.	Follow the given installation procedure, use of adequate cooling technology, perform regular inspections of the ven- tilation units.		ate ature. rm	ring of inverter temper-		

EXAMPLES	(page1)				PVF	S 4-2 vs.01
Examples 1-3					ORA	e 8(5/2014
	Installation in o [TUV Rheinlan]	direct sun light. d]	cessible for	ot or difficult ac- operation and [TUV Rhein-		ottom, top or to ow. [TUV Rhein-
Severity		⊢ <u>+</u> ,3 <u>+</u> ,	e m	H2	ſ	<u>⊢+</u> ,3 <u>+</u> ,
Examples 4-5	A C O Forrador					
	Housing not [TUV Rheinlan		Presence of in terial. [SUPSI]	flammable ma-		
Severity		1	f	.1		

Component Defect	Inverter Not operating (complete failure) PVFS 4-3vs.01							
Appearance	If the inverter does not work despite good production conditions, common problems are the lack of restart after grid faults or isolation faults . The inverter may show fault codes to help understanding the problem. This can be observed by checking the display or the data log of the monitoring system. Examples for hardware defects in the inverter are discoloured or burned cable interconnections or fuses. Damaged parts can be found by visual inspection or infrared thermography (IRT).							
Detection	MON, (VI, I-V, VOC)							
Origin	A complete failure of the inverter occurs due one or more malfunctions of single hardware or software component of the inverter or faults due to grounding issues, e.g. high humidity inside the inverter, or a firmware issue.							
	Production	Installation	Operation					
Impact	actions must be taken. When t must be identified in most case the firmware for technical rea requirements. While damaged string inverter are replaced mo	he restart does not work or the es by a service team. Software i sons or to update the system hardware components of centr	Formance losses and immediate fault occurs recurrently the origin ssues can be solved by updating to new standards/grid technical ral inverters are usually repaired, . Damaged hardware can cause ified personnel.					
	Safety:	Performance:	3 4 5					
Action	Corrective actions	Preventive actions (recommended)	Preventive actions (optional)					
	Restart the inverter. Replace the components with defect or abnormal temperature. Up- date the software.	r						

EXAMPLES (page1)					PV	FS 4-3vs.01
Examples 1-3						
	Insulation failure. [TUV Rheinland]		Not operating inverter. [TUV Rheinland]		Damaged hardware compo- nent. [37]	
Severity	e	<u>⊢</u> <u>3</u> 4 5		<u>⊢</u>	f e	·-···5

